UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-12-2012

DeGroot v. Standley Trenching, Inc. Clerk's Record
v. 7 Dckt. 39406

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"DeGroot v. Standley Trenching, Inc. Clerk's Record v. 7 Dckt. 39406" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4429.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4429

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

/3
(

s

ALRE ORD)

THE

LAW CLERK

REMECOURT

o
CHARLES J Y DE GROOT and
DE GROOT ARMS, L .,
Plaintiff:
ppellan

unlerdefendan

~~~~~~~--

-v -

J\NDLEYTRENCHlNG,
dfb/aSf
LEY

Defendant-CounterclaimantIt pond nt,

and

J. HOULE FILS, IN , a
Canadian corporation,

Defendant-Re pondent.
pp aled from the Oi trict of th Third Judicial Di trid
for the tate of Idaho in aod for anyoo ouofy

Honorable GREGORY M. C LET District Judge

Kevin E. Dinius and Michael J. Hanby IT
DINIUS LAW
Attorn ys for

ppellants

M. Michael Sasser
SASSER & INGliS, PC
Robert D. Lewis
CANTRILL SKINNER SULIJVAN & KING LLP

,.f '

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF IDA.l-lO

CHARLES JAY DE GROOT and
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713
CANTRlLL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 Tyrell Lane
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co.
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
FARMS, LLC,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

)

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2001-7777

)

STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
)
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & FILS, ~
INC., a Canadian corporation,
)
Defendants.
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO.,
Counterclaimant,

vs.
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT
FARMS, LLC,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDA VIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS
IN SUPPORT OF
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION
FOR AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST AND ENTRY OF
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON
COUNTERCLAIM

--------------------------)

)

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION
FORAW ARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT
ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 1

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
): ss
)

ROBERT D. LEWIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That he is the attorney of record for the Counterclaimant, Standley Trenching, Inc.,

d/b/a Standley & Co., and has personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit.
2.

That a Judgment was entered in favor of the Counterclaimant in the above entitled

action on or about April 4, 2005.
3.

That pursuant to said Judgment there is now due and owing by the Counterdefendants

Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC to the Counterclaimant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a
Standley & Co., in the sum of$20,259.57.
4.

That pursuant to Rule 69 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, I have calculated the

prejudgment interest due on the Judgment amount entered in this action, which was 12.0%, from
March 16, 2001 through and including April 4, 2005, which calculates out to be $6.66 per diem.
5.

That the calculated prejudgment interest accrued on the Judgment entered in this

action is at the rate of accruing interest of 12% per annum ($6.66 per diem) from March 16, 2001
to April 4, 2005 is $9,856.80.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION
FOR A WARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT
ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 2

Further your affiant sayeth not.

Robert D. Lewis

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this

I~y of April, 2005.

NO ARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at ~_ fi::>
I
Commission Expires 101d?iI09
(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,,-I hereby certify that on the
day of April, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:

L::L

Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
WHITE PETERSON
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200
Nampa,ID 83687
William A. McCurdy
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000
Boise, ID 83702
Michael E. Kelly
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856

[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[ ]
[ ]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[X]

Robert D. Lewis
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION
FORAW ARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT
ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 3
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713
CANTRlLL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 Tyrell Lane
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212

o

Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co.

....

C

~
(!)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
FARMS, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

ST AND LEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
)
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & FILS, ~
J
INC., a Canadian corporation,
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CV 2001-7777

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY
FEES

----------------------------)
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO.,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT
FARMS, LLC,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)

~
)
)

------------------------------)
)

COMES NOW The Counterclaim ant, Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co., by and
through its counsel of record, Robert D. Lewis, of the firm Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King LLP,
and pursuant to the Judgement on Counterclaim issued by the Court in this matter on April 4, 2005
and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e), hereby submits to this Court Exhibit "A" attached hereto

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES - Page 1

as a true and correct accounting of attorney fees incurred by Counterclaimant in pursuit of the
Counterclaim.

ATTORNEY FEES
For itemization, please refer to Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

TOTAL FEES ........................................................ $8,359.00
Attorney
Paralegal

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

$8,268.00
$ 9l.00

)
) ss.
)

Robert D. Lewis, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am familiar with the attorneys fees expended in prosecution of the Counterclaim in
this case, and set forth the amount herein which is computed upon an hourly basis,
considering the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the case, and the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, and the experience and ability of
the attorney in the particular field of law, and prevailing charges for like work, the
amount involved and results obtained, and awards in similar cases.

2.

The basis for computing the attorneys fees herein is at an hourly rate of $130.00 for
Robert D. Lewis, attorney, and $65.00 for paralegal Mary L. Hainline.

3.

The Counterclaim arose from a commercial transaction. Attorneys fees are allowed
to the prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). The defense to the
Counterclaim was also pursued within the provisions of Idaho Code § 12-121, since
there was no merit to the claim that there was no amount due on open account.

4.

The attorneys fees stated herein constitute a full, true and correct statement
summarizing Counterclaimant's reasonable attorneys fees expended in this action,
each item having been actually and necessarily incurred, and your affiant alleges on
information and belief that said attorneys fees are in compliance with Rule 54,
I.R. C.P., and allowed on the Judgment on Counterclaim issued by this Court on April
4,2005.

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES - Page 2

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT.

Robert D. Lewis
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this
.0t~~~~+

SERRANO

~
~

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO
't
.' .'"c··~"':';'~~~''''''iil,IJ'-;l,.J.

JE!iay of April, 2005.

~(;V:1ft&G~tu~~
Nolstry Pub~ic for Idaho
Residing atC33 OWQ {D .
Commission Expires: ;> 10by;101
~I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on the 15th day of April, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:
Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
WHITE PETERSON
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200
Nampa, ID 83687
William A. McCurdy
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000
Boise, ID 83702
Michael E. Kelly
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856

[ ]
[ ]

[X]

[ ]
[ ]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[X]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

Robert D. Lewis

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES - Page 3
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Exhibit "A"
11/8/2002 RDL

Telephone conference with M. Kelly about view of Department of
Agriculture documents; prepare letter to Kelly about Standley
documents; view Department of Agriculture documents.

299.00

11/12/2002 RDL

Telephone conference with K. Trainor about defense; prepare letter to
M. Kelly about SUbstitution of counsel.

52.00

11/13/2002 RDL

Telephone conference with A Ward about meeting electricians;
telephone conference with J. Grigg; telephone conference with M. Kelly.

52.00

11/14/2002 RDL

Prepare letter to Continental Western about fee reimbursement and
clarification of insurers reservations.

39.00

11/18/2002 RDL

Review deposition notices and letter from plaintiffs counsel; telephone
conference with K. Trainor.

52.00

11/19/2002 RDL

Telephone conference with M. Kelly about case strategy; telephone
conference with J. Grigg; telephone conference with A. Ward
cancelling meeting; telephone conference with K. Standley about case
status.

78.00

11/25/2002 RDL

Review Standley motion for summary judgment, memorandum,
affidavit and notice of hearing; prepare letter to K. Standley about
summary jUdgment; prepare letter to K. Standley about Houle's
position; review Houle's discovery responses.

11/27/2002 RDL

Telephone conference with K. Trainor about case status.

26.00

12/212002 RDL

Review letter from plaintiffs counsel about depositions.

39.00

12/3/2002 RDL

Review plaintiffs motion to amend complaint; prepare motion to amend
counterclaim; prepare letter to Kurt Standley.

12/4/2002 RDL

Telephone conference with K. Trainer about case status.

13.00

12/6/2002 RDl

Review letter from Kelly to plaintiffs counsel about deposition dates.

26.00

12/10/2002 RDL

Review plaintiffs memorandum, affidavit, and Rule 56(f) affidavit
opposing Standley's motion for summary judgment

39.00

12111/2002 RDL

Telephone conference with Judge Culet's clerk; telephone conference
with M. Kelly about vacating pretrial conference.

39.00

12/12/2002 RDL

Telephone conference with K. Trainer about trial vacated; prepare letter
to insurer about fee reimbursement; telephone conference with K.
Standley about case status.

12/16/2002 RDL

Telephone conference with plaintiffs counsel about stipulation to
amend pleadings; review stipulation; telephone conference with M.
Kelly about stipulation.

91.00

1/9/2003 RDL

Prepare letter to B. McCammon about insurance payment.

26.00

1/17/2003 RDL

Prepare letter to K. Standley about billing and case status.

1

007

104.00

104.00

104.00

39.00

3/31/2003 RDL

st for trial setting; telephone confere
; prepare response to request for trial

M.

78.00

4/10/2003 RDL

Review order setting trial; prepare letter to K. Standley.

52.00

4/14/2003 RDL

Telephone conference with K. Standley about case status.

26.00

4/15/2003 RDL

Telephone conference with M. Kelly about deposition dates; review
scheduling stipulation and return to Kelly.

39.00

4/23/2003 RDL

Review deposition notices for Standley, Griggs, and HartZelL

39.00

4/25/2003 RDL

Review Standley's responses to request for admissions and fully
executed stipulation for discovery.

39.00

4/29/2003 RDL

Telephone conference with M. Kelly about deposition schedule.

26.00

5/2/2003 RDL

Review letter from Kelly to plaintiffs counsel with deposition notices for
C. DeGroot and E. DeGroot; telephone conference with M. Kelly.

52.00

5/6/2003 RDL

Review letter with stipulation and order to dismiss K. Standley; prepare
letter to K Trainor; telephone conference with M. Kelly.

65.00

5/8/2003 RDL

Review amended complaint and proposed answer, and prepare
counterclaim.

104.00

5/19/2003 RDL

Review conformed copy of Standley answer and counter-claim;
prepare letter to K. Trainer.

39.00

7/7/2003 RDL

Telephone conference with K. Standley about case status; Prepare
letter to M. Kelly about moving case forward; Prepare letter to K.
Standley about return of retainer and agreement to pay.

78.00

7/9/2003 RDL

Telephone conference with Plaintiffs counsel and M. Kelly about
deposition schedule.

26.00

8/15/2003 RDL

Review letter from discovery counsel to Kelly and Kelly's response
letter. Telephone conference with M. Kelly about vacated depositions.

39.00

9/25/2003 RDL

Review reply to co-counsel; prepare letter to K. Standley.

39.00

10/15/2003 RDL

Review amended deposition notices of K. Standley, J. Griggs and T.
Hatzell.

39.00

10/23/2003 RDL

Review letter from Plaintiffs counsel vacating C. DeGrout deposition.
Telephone conference with Kent Stanley about case status.

39.00

11/12/2003 RDL

Attend deposition of E. DeGroot; prepare letter to K. Standley with
deposition summary.

11/26/2003 RDL

Review pretrial conference rescheduling.

26.00

12/17/2003 RDL

Review motion for protective order and notice of hearing.

26.00

12/19/2003 RDL

Travel to and from Caldwell; attend pretrial conference.

12/31/2003 RDL

Prepare letter to Kurt about new trial date.

2

598.00

260.00

39.00

1/5/2004 RDL

Review order

ation and order on pretrial conferen

39.00

1/26/2004 RDL

Conference with Standley, Griggs and Hartzell at M. Kelly's office; file
review and prepare for C. DeGroot deposition.

312.00

1/27/2004 RDL

Telephone conference with M. Kelly; attend deposition of C. DeGroot;
prepare deposition summary.

884.00

2/2/2004 RDL

Telephone conference with M. Kelly about Standley and Company
depositions.

52.00

2/24/2004 RDL

Telephone conference 'v'Vith Plaintiffs counsel about mediation; prepare
letter to Plaintiffs counsel about trial schedule.

39.00

2/25/2004 RDL

Telephone conference with M. Kelly about case status.

13.00

2/26/2004 RDL

Review C. DeGroot deposition transcript regarding possible summary
judgment.

52.00

3/11/2004 RDL

Review Houle's motion to compel.

26.00

3/15/2004 RDL

Prepare letter to M. Kelly about mediatiop.

26.00

3/17/2004 RDL

Review letter from Houle's counsel about vacating mediation; Telephone
conference with M. Kelly about mediation cancellation; prepar!? mediatfon
statement.

3/19/2004 RDL

Review letter from Plaintiffs counsel about new mediation date; review
Hooper report; prepare letter to K. Standley_

78.00

3/22/2004 RDL

Telephone conference with P. Dougherty about acquiring a stipulation and
order dismissing Kurt Standley, individually; prepare letter to K. Trainer.

39.00

4/15/2004 MLH

Calculate prejudgment interest and forward mediation statement to Mike
Kelley for review.

19.50

4/19/2004 RDL

Telephone conference with M. Kelly about mediation; revise mediation
statement; Telephone conference with K. Standley about mediation.

91.00

4/21/2004 RDL

Prepare for and attend mediation; travel to and from Nampa.

4/27/2004 RDL

Prepare exhibit list and witness list; prepare letter to M. Kelly.

4/30/2004 RDL

Telephone conference with M. Kelly about possible settlement.

26.00

5/312004 RDL

Telephone conference with Kurt about settlement possibilities and trial
strategy.

26'.00

5/6/2004 RDL

Travel to and from Caldwell; attend pretrial conference with Judge Culet.

130.00

806.00
156.00

312.00

5/13/2004 RDL

Review order setting trial for October 25,2004 (10days).

26.00

5/26/2004 RDL

Review offer of judgment.

13.00

6/28/2004 RDL

Review order resetting trial for April 25, 2005.

26.00

12/8/2004 RDL

Review Houle request for supplemental responses to discovery.

26.00

117/2005 RDL

Telephone conference with K. Standley about summary judgment;
telephone conference with M. Kelly about vacating trial; file review
regarding Summary Judgment preparation; prepare letter to M. Kelly
about Beltman deposition; prepare motion for Summary Judgment;
prepare memo supporting motion for Summary Judgment.

3

273.00

1/12/2005 RDL

Research
Idaho law with action on open account;
memo
in Summary J
, telephone conference with K. Standley; prepare
affidavit of K. Standley; prepare letter to K. Standley.

1/24/2005 MLH

Draft witness disclosure.

1/27/2005 RDL

Revise and final Summary Judgment materials.

1/28/2005 RDL

Prepare notice of hearing on Summary Judgment.

39.00

Attorney Fee:
Review Standley memorandum on Summary Judgment for case-in-chief.

52.00

21112005 RDL

2/15/2005 RDL

2/17/2005 RDL

2/18/2005 RDL

2/24/2005 RDL

3/112005 RDL

338.00

26.00

104.00

Attorney Fee:
Review DeGroot's response to motion for Summary Judgment; research
regarding Idaho case law on burden of non-moving party to establish
issue of fact.

156.00

Attorney Fee:
Prepare reply memo on Summary Judgment.

156.00

Attorney Fee:
Final reply memo on Motion for StJmmary Judgment on counterclaim.

91.00

Attorney Fee:
Review M. Kelly reply memo on Standby motion for Summary Judgment.

52.00

Attorney Fee:
Prepare for hearing on Summary Judgment; travel to and from Caldwell;
attend hearing on Summary Judgment; telephone conference with K.
Trainer.

494.00

Attorney Fee:
Telephone conference with K. Standley about summary judgment ruling.

26.00

3/18/2005 RDL

Attorney Fee:
Telephone conference with M. Kelly about attendance at pre-trial
conference.

26.00

3/21/2005 RDL

Attorney Fee:
Prepare for and attend telephone status conference with court and
Plaintiffs counsel.

3/7/2005 RDL

RDL

104.00

Attorney Fee:
Review DeGroot's motion to vacate trial setting.

39.00

3/29/2005 RDL

Attorney Fee:
Review order confirming Summary Judgment.

39.00

3/29/2005 MLH

Paralegal
Draft judgment.

45.50

3/30/2005 RDL

Attorney Fee:
Finalize judgment on counterclaim; prepare letter to court; prepare letter
to K. Standley. .

91.00
Total

4

1.0

$8,359.00

SUMMARY

Robert D. Lewis

63.60 @

$130Ihr

$8,268.00

Mary L. Hainline

1.40

$651hr

$ 91.00
$8,359.00

@
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 Tyrell Lane
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
FARMS, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)

)
)
)

STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
)
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & FILS, ~
INC., a Canadian corporation,
)
Defendants.

)

Case No. CV 2001-7777

COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION
FOR AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST AND ENTRY OF
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON
COUNTERCLAIM

----------------------------))
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO.,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT
FARMS,LLC,
Counterdefendants.

,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

---------------------------)

)

COMES NOW The Counterclaimant, Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co., by and
through its counsel of record, Robert D. Lewis, of the firm Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King LLP,
and pursuant to the Judgement on Counterclaim issued by the Court in this matter on April 4, 2005,

COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 1

hereby moves this Honorable Court for an Order awarding prejudgment interest on the sum of
$20,259.57, accruing at the statutory rate of 12% per annum from March 16,2001 to April 4, 2005,
the entry date of Judgment on Counterclaim, totaling $9,856.80.
Counterclaimant further moves this Honorable Court for issuance of an Amended Judgment
itemizing the prejudgment interests allowable by law.
This motion is made and based upon the records and pleadings on file in the above-entitled

-

matter, together with the Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis, filed of even date herewith.
DATED this ~ day of April, 2005.
CANTRlLL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP

By:jg~~;

Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching,
Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co.

COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

t.5-"-

I hereby certify that on the
day of April, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:
Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
WHITE PETERSON
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200
Nampa,ID 83687
\Villiam A. McCurdy
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000
Boise, ID 83702
Michael E. Kelly
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856

[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[ ]
[ ]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[X]

Robert D. Lewis

COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 3
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB #27l3
CANTRILL, SKJ}·rNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 Tyrell Lane
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
FARMS,LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2001-7777

)
ORDER

)
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & FILS, ~
INC., a Canadian corporation,
)
Defendants.
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO.,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT
FARMS, LLC,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

--------------------------)

)

On May 31, 2005, this Court heard oral argument on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider
Judgment on Counterclaim, Standley Trenching Inc.'s Motion for Prejudgment Interest and Entry
of Amended Judgment on Counterclaim, and Standley Trenching Inc.'s Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certificate. Plaintiff appeared by way of counsel, Jill S. Holinka. Counterclaimant Standley
ORDER - Page 1

o

Trenching Inc., appeared by counsel Robert D. Lewis. Defendant J. Houle & Fils, Inc., appeared
by way of counsel William A. McCurdy. Having reviewed the record in this case and heard oral
argument, the Court enters the following Orders:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Judgment on Counterclaim is DENIED.

2.

Counterclaimant's Motion to add a Rule 54(b) Certificate is DENIED, as it is
premature, although the matter may be taken up again if the status of the case
changes.

3.

Counterclaimant's Motion for Prejudgment Interest is entered for the period of March
16,2001 to April 4, 2005, with the amount of$9,856.80 found due and owing at the
statutory rate, and this issue may be taken up later, when the status of the case
changes.

IT IS SO ORDERED this

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of June, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:
Julie Klein Fischer
Jill Holinka
WHITE PETERSON
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200
Nampa, ID 83687

[]
[]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[ ]
[ ]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

){;]

William A. McCurdy
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000
Boise, ID 83702

X

Michael E. Kelly
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856

[ ]
[ ]
[]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

Robert D. Lewis
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP
P.O. Box 359
Boise, ID 83701

[ ]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

»}
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713
CANTRILL, SKJ1'..TNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 Tyrell Lane
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212
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Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
FARMS, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

STANDLEY TRENCHING. INC., d/b/a
)
STANDLEY & CO., and 1. HOULE & FILS, ~
INC., a Canadian corporation,
)
Defendants.
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO.,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT
FARMS, LLC,
Counterdefendants.

Case No. CV 2001-7777

COUNTERCLAIMANT
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
SUPPORTING AN AWARD OF FEES

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

------------------------------)

)

COMES NOW Counterclaim ant, Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co.,
("Standley"), by and through its attorneys of record, Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP, and
hereby presents this Memorandum to the Court in support of its claim for attorneys fees on the

COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL
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Counterclaim. Following the hearing on Plaintiffs' Objection to Costs held June 29, this Court gave
all parties an opportunity to file a Supplemental Memorandum on or before July 22, 2005.
At the hearing, the Court ruled from the bench that (1) this Counterclaim is based upon a
commercial transaction, and (2) there is a statute that governs attorneys fees applying to this matter,
Idaho Code § 12-120. The Court also ruled that (3) Counterclaimant Standley was a prevailing party,
and that Standley also prevailed against Plaintiff on its defenses to the Complaint. Summary
Judgment has been issued to Standley both on the Counterclaim and against all claims made by
Plaintiff DeGroot.
The question presented by the Court that is addressed by this Memorandum is whether
Standley can be the prevailing party for an award of attorneys fees or costs, when this action has been
consolidated with a new suit filed by DeGroot versus Beltman. Standley is a Third Party Defendant
in the DeGroot v. Beltman case under a Third Party Complaint filed by Beltman.
As the Court knows from the position set forth by Standley at the hearing, the consolidation
was acquired without notice or opportunity to be heard by Counterclaimant/Defendant Standley.
Although the exact circumstances of the stipulation are unknown to the undersigned, apparently
DeGroot counsel stipulated with Beltman counsel to consolidate the actions. Standley reserves the
right to contest that consolidation at a later time. For purposes of this Memorandum, and as will be
seen by the argument below, Standley does not believe that the consolidation is material to the
question of prevailing party and costs in the initial action between DeGroot and Standley.
Rule 54(d)(1)(B), I.R.C.P., provides the Court with the basis for determining which party
to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs. As the rule states "the trial court in its sound
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and
COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING AN AWARD OF FEES- Page 2

upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable
manner .... " (Emphasis added.)
Counterclaim ant perceives that the Court is reluctant to now award attorney fees because of
his concern about the effect of the DeGroot v. Beltman lawsuit on liabilities of DeGroot and
Standley.
In the first place, that concern can be overcome by interpretation of the express language in
the Civil Rule. The use of the term "action" is determinative. Rule 2 defines action, and states that
"there shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action." Rule 3(a) (1 ) states that "a civil
action is commenced by a filing of a complaint with the Court, .... No claim, controversy or dispute
may be submitted to any court in the state for determination or judgment without filing a Complaint
"

DeGroot v. Standley is one action. That action has resulted in a Judgment awarded to
Standley on the Counterclaim. That action has resulted in a Summary Judgment in favor of Standley
against all claims asserted by DeGroot in its Complaint. Regardless of any other action that has been
or may be filed by DeGroot against any other entity, it is only the result ofthe DeGroot v. Standley
action that is pertinent to this Court's decision on whether to award costs and attorneys fees to
Standley.
The DeGroot v. Beltman action is entirely separate from the action in which Standley now
seeks costs and attorneys fees. DeGroot did not prevail against Standley. Whether Beltman prevails
against Standley in the DeGroot v. Beltman action is irrelevant. This situation has been addressed
by one federal court. Defendant's costs can be assessed against a Plaintiff, when not the prevailing
party, even when another Plaintiff does prevail in an action consolidated for trial. Modick v. Carvel
COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING AN AWARD OF FEES- Page 3
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Stores of New York. Inc., 209 F. Supp. 361 (D. N.Y. 1962).
Even though consolidated, the two actions that are of concern to this Court are separate and
apart. At issue are costs and attorneys fees in the action initiated by DeGroot against Standley and
Houle. The rules set forth above contemplate that this Court only consider the results in this action
in determining which party is a prevailing party and entitled to costs and fees. Filing the DeGroot
v. Beltman action does not save DeGroot from a fee award. Nor does consolidating the two separate
actions.
Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that the Court finds some reason to overlook
the meaning of "action," consolidation should not playa factor in determining who is the prevailing
party between DeGroot and Standley.
DeGroot chose to sue Standley in the DeGroot v. Standlev action. Standley Counterclaimed
against DeGroot in the DeGroot v. Standlev action. Those claims are final for all intents and
purposes, aithough the Court has yet to certify them as final because Houle remains as a party in the
DeGroot v. Standley action.
There is no potential for offset in the DeGroot v. BeItman case of a fee award to Standley.
There is no legal basis for DeGroot to make any claim against Standley. Nor should such an offset
be made between Beltman and Standley, since Beltman is not a party to the DeGroot v. Standley
action.
Also, a claim of offset requires that DeGroot prevail against Beltman in the DeGroot v.
Beltman case. Such a recovery is no more than mere speculation, since Beltman has valid defenses
against DeGroot's claims. If DeGroot does not prevail, there can be no argument for offset. When
Beltman prevails against DeGroot, DeGroot should be paying costs and attorneys fees to Beltman.
COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL
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Assuming that DeGroot does prevail against Beltman, then an offset would arise only if
Beltman recovers against Standley. Standley has valid defenses against any claim for indemnity or
contribution by Beltman. When Standley prevails, Beltman will not.
The possible results in the DeGroot v. Beltman suit are numerous. It is hard to understand
how any result in the DeGroot v. Beltman action could lead to any claim that there be an offset in
favor of DeGroot for the costs and attorneys fees that this Court should award in favor of Standley
against DeGroot in the DeGroot v.

Standl~

action.

Finally, set off or offset law has not been developed in Idaho. There has been development
of some issues in federal court. For instance, in Goldman v. Burch, 780 F. Supp. 1441 (D. N.Y.
1992), the Court held that a Defendant can be the prevailing party on a Counterclaim for the purpose
of a cost award, even if Plaintiff has prevailed to a lesser degree on the case in chief. The case
addresses who the prevailing party is and does not involve consolidation, but it is instructive on an
award of attorneys fees and costs even if Plaintiff does prevail, which DeGroot does not.
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jacobson, 37 F.R.D. 427 (D. Mo. 1965), the Court ruled that a
judgment for costs awarded on appeal should not be set off against judgment on the merits for
Plaintiff. This case is instructive on the fact that an award of costs that becomes a judgment is
separate from the claims made by Plaintiff in their case in chief. Thus, a claim of offset is not sound
basis for determining the prevailing party issue.
Counterclaimant Standley believes that the Civil Rules and the cited cases firmly establish
that fees and costs should be awarded against DeGroot, and the consolidation with another action
is not relevant.

COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL
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CONCLUSION
Clearly, Counterclaimant Standley is the prevailing party and should be awarded attorneys
fees. DeGroot chose to sue Standley and Houle, without also suing Beltman, and DeGroot chose to
dispute the Counterclaim with no factual or legal defenses. This Court has ruled that Standley
prevails on all of Standley's claims against DeGroot and all of DeGroot' s claims against Standley.
The DeGroot v. Standley action is but one lawsuit and the issues before this Court on costs and
attorneys fees should not be affected by the fact that DeGroot has now gone and filed a separate
lawsuit in the DeGroot v. Beltman action. The two actions are completely separate. All costs and
fees incurred by Standley pursuing the Counterclaim are related only to the DeGroot v. Standley
action. The award of costs and attorneys fees should be made now, regardless of any claims pending
in the DeGroot v. Beltman action.
There is no legal or factual basis by which an award of costs and attorneys fees in favor of
Standley can be offset if DeGroot prevails in the DeGroot v. Beltman action. DeGroot has no claim
against Standley, but only against Beltman.
Counterclaimant Standley respectfully requests this Court to award its attorneys fees. Such
order should leave open all fees incurred by Counterclaimant Standley until this action is final. The
claim for attorneys fees includes not only those fees sought in the Initial Memorandum, but also
those fees sought through any Supplemental Memorandum of Costs that may be filed within the time
constraints contemplated by Rule 54(d)(5).

DATED this 22nd day of July, 2005.
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CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP

~
~

By:

Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching,
Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of July, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:
Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
WHITE PETERSON
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200
Nampa, ID 83687

[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

William A. McCurdy
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000
Boise, ID 83702

[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

Michael E. Kelly
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856

[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

Robert D. Lewis
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United States District Court S.D. New York.
Lester M. MODICK et a!., Plaintiffs,
v.
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI.,
Defendants.
James OS SOLA et aI., Plaintiffs,

v.

Taxation of costs affirmed except to extent of
referring matter to clerk for ascertainment of
charges for additional copies so that such charges
could be deleted from taxation of costs.
See also 206 F.Supp. 636.
West Headnotes

CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI.,
Defendants.
Joseph P. PHELAN, Plaintiff,
v.
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI.,
Defendants.
James P. PIERCE et a1., Plaintiffs,
v.
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI.,
Defendants.
Matthew SEU et aI., Plaintiffs,
v.
CARVEL CORPORATION et aI., Defendants.
Paul S. GIBERMAN et aI., Plaintiffs,
v.
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et a1.,
Defendants.
Joseph PAZDRO et aI., Plaintiffs,
v.
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI.,
Defendants.
Oct. 1, 1962.
Motion to review taxation of costs in actions for
fraud and for violation of antitrust laws where, in
four of the actions, the plaintiffs had established
antitrust violations. The District Court, Dawson, 1.,
held that, in actions in which neither fraud nor
antitrust violations had been established, costs had
been properly taxed against unsuccessful plaintiffs
for docket fees, taking of depositions by defendants,
and cost of transcripts of trial testimony, but that
costs attributable to duplicate copies of defendants'
depositions and trial transcripts should be deleted.

[I) Federal Civil Procedure €=2727
170Ak2727 Most Cited Cases
Fact that certain of the plaintiffs
actions
consolidated
for
established anti-trust violations
plaintiffs "prevailing parties"
taxation of costs.

in separate antitrust
trial
successfully
did not render all
for purposes of

(2) Federal Civil Procedure €=2727
170Ak2727 Most Cited Cases
Where a plaintiff is not the prevailing party costs
are properly assessed against him even though his
action has been joined with that of another plaintiff
and even though the actions were consolidated for
trial.
(3) Federal Civil Procedure €=2736

170Ak2736 Most Cited Cases
As part of taxation of costs docket fees were
properly assessed for all nine fraud and antitrust
cases which had been consolidated for trial where
docket fees were in fact incurred in each of the
separate actions and where actions had been
consolidated only a relatively short time before trial.
(4) Federal Civil Procedure €=2738
170Ak2738 Most Cited Cases
Cost of taking depositions is taxable in favor of
prevailing party when the taking of the deposition
was reasonably necessary even though deposition
taken may not have been used at the trial. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1920(2).
(5) Federal Civil Procedure €=2738
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170Ak2738 Most Cited Cases
Cost of depositions taken on behalf of prevailing
defendants in fraud and antitrust actions would be
taxed against plaintiffs notwithstanding their
voluminous length and high cost where depositions
merely represented results of defendants' full use of
legitimate pre-trial procedures to ascertain exact
nature of plaintiffs' charges. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920(2).

[6] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2738
170Ak2738 Most Cited Cases
Cost of defendants' depositions taxed against
unsuccessful plaintiffs in fraud and antitrust actions
would be limited to the cost of a single original
copy and would not include cost of duplicate copies
obtained for convenience of counsel.
[7] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases
Cost of transcripts of trial testimony may be taxed
against losing party when in court's judgment such
transcripts are necessary for use in case. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1920(2).
[8] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases
In fraud and antitrust trial lasting over six weeks
and involving twelve different factual situations and
interrelated claims necessitating availability of prior
testimony to avoid time-wasting disagreements as to
previous testimony, transcript was reasonably
necessary for use in the case and its cost was
properly taxed against losing plaintiffs. 28
U.S.c.A. § 1920(2).

[9] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases
In action in which a trial transcript was necessary
for use in the case, losing plaintiffs were properly
taxed for its cost and cost of one copy for use of
defense counsel, but plaintiffs could not properly be
taxed for cost of additional copies. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1920(2).
[10] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases
Cost of transcripts of pre-trial conferences is
taxable when such transcripts are necessary for use

in the case.
[11] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases
Cost of transcripts of pre-trial conferences devoted
to limiting and clarifying issues and fonnulating
plan of trial procedures in fraud and antitrust
actions was properly taxed to unsuccessful plaintiffs
as part of taxation of costs.
[12] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2741
170Ak2741 Most Cited Cases
Witness fees are properly includable as costs of trial
even where witness is friendly and appears
voluntarily and is an officer of a corporate
defendant. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920(3).

[13] Witnesses €;::::>24
410k24 Most Cited Cases
Witnesses who are real parties in interest are not
entitled to reimbursement or allowance for their
testimony.
(14) Witnesses €;::::>25
410k25 Most Cited Cases
Where actions were consolidated for trial witness
fees were properly allowed real parties in interest
where they testified in actions in which they were
not party defendants.
*362 Greenfield, Rothstein, Klein & Yarnell, New
York City, for plaintiffs, Sidney W. Rothstein, Jules
Yarnell, New York City, of counsel.

Amen, Weisman & Butler, New York City, for
'Carvel' defendants, Herbert F. Roth, Astoria, N.Y.,
of counsel.

DA WSON, District Judge.
This is a motion to review taxation of costs in the
above actions. The costs have been taxed by the
Clerk only in those cases in which a final judgment
was directed to be entered on behalf of the
defendants. There are four actions which still await
trial on the issue of damages. In those cases no
costs have been taxed. There were originally nine
lawsuits, in which there were a total of twelve sets
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of plaintiffs. Each lawsuit alleged a cause of action
based on fraud and also a cause of action based on
violations of the antitrust laws.
In accordance with a pre-trial order entered on
September 22, 1961 all of the actions for fraud were
consolidated for trial pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. A trial was
had and findings of fact and conclusions of law
were filed on February 7, 1962. Thereafter the
causes of action based on alleged violations of the
antitrust laws went to trial. These also were
consolidated for trial. Findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the antitrust causes of action
were filed on June 7, 1962. All of the actions for
fraud were dismissed for failure of proof. All of the
actions for alleged violations of the antitrust *363
laws, with the exception of four, were dismissed. In
those four cases the Court decided that the plaintiffs
had established violations of the antitrust laws and
directed that a hearing be held on the issue of
damages. This hearing on the issue of damages has
not yet been had and no costs are sought in those
cases at the present time.
Since the causes of action of the various plaintiffs
were different causes of action involving different
sets of facts it became necessary to determine
separately the facts as to each set of plaintiffs, both
on the fraud causes of action and on the antitrust
causes of action, and findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw were handed down separately.
There were a total of sixteen defendants in the
fraud causes of action and a total of twenty-three
defendants in the antitrust causes of action. It
appears from the motion papers submitted by
plaintiffs' attorneys that plaintiffs are challenging
only the taxation of costs secured by the so-called
'Carvel' defendants and not by the supplier
defendants.

consolidated for trial and four of the plaintiffs won
on the actions for violations of the antitrust laws all
plaintiffs should be deemed to be prevailing parties
and therefore not liable for costs. This, of course, is
erroneous. The fact that the actions were
consolidated for trial does not mean that they were
any less separate cases. Such consolidation was for
the convenience of parties and the Court. There
were the same number of cases tried in both the
fraud and antitrust aspects and each case must stand
on its own feet so far as costs are concerned. The
consolidation of separate causes of action involving
separate plaintiffs for trial purposes does not free a
losing plaintiff from the duty of paying costs simply
because another one of the plaintiffs was successful.
'Where two causes of action, each by a different
plaintiff and each against the same defendant, are
consolidated for trial, and but one plaintiff is
successful, the successful plaintiff is entitled to
costs, and defendant is entitled to costs against the
unsuccessful plaintiff. * * *, 20 C.l.S. Costs § 95, p.
346; Cornell v. Gulf Oil Corp., 35 F.Supp. 448
(E.D.Pa.1940).
In the Pierce action there were four plaintiffs, each
alleging separate causes of action sounding in fraud
and violation of the antitrust laws. Here again
certain plaintiffs won and certain plaintiffs lost,
depending upon the facts of the case. The Court, so
far as allowance of costs is concerned, will have to
treat each plaintiff separately; those who lost will
have to pay costs and those who won will be treated
as prevailing parties. The mere fact that plaintiffs
joined their causes of action in one suit does not
change this rule. Since the four sets of plaintiffs
joined in this action did not complain of damages
arising out of a single transaction or occurrence,
and since the evidence and proof at trial involved
four separate claims, with four separate factual
situations, each plaintiff will be treated separately in
determining the prevailing party entitled to costs.

1. The Prevailing Parties
[I] The first contention of the plaintiffs on this
motion for retaxation of costs is that plaintiffs are
the prevailing parties and therefore not liable for
costs. They assert that since the actions were

[2] Where a plaintiff was the prevailing party no
costs have been assessed against him. Where
plaintiff was not the prevailing party costs were
properly assessed against him, even though his
action had been joined with that of another plaintiff

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

httn:llnrint.westJaw.com/del1verv htm l?rlp<:t=::ltnRrfnrITl::lt=l-1Tl\lfT

P Rrrl",b;rl= A 00" "QOOOOOO') ';:0'10

'7 n 1 /"I{){)C

Page 5 of7

209 F.Supp. 361

Page 4

209 F.Supp. 361,6 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1025
(Cite as: 209 F.Supp. 361)

and even though the action was consolidated for
trial.
2. Docket Fees
[3] Plaintiffs urge, in the second place, that there
should be only a single docket fee in all nine cases
since there was a consolidation for trial. This
overlooks the fact that docket fees were incurred in
each of the actions and that the *364 actions were
consolidated only a relatively short time before
trial. A docket fee in each case was properly
assessed.
3. Costs for Depositions
Plaintiffs also complain about the allowance of
costs for depositions.
[4] It is well established that the cost of taking
deposition is taxable in favor of the prevailing party
when 'the taking of the deposition was reasonably
necessary even though it may not have been used at
the trial.' 4 Moore, Federal Practice § 1207. Title
28 U.S.c. § 1920(2) sets forth clearly that the
standard for taxing deposition costs is the necessity
for use in the case. This language was changed from
on the trial to indicate that discovery expenses, as
well as trial expenses, can be recovered by the
prevailing party if reasonably necessary. See
Perlman v. Feldmann, 116 F.Supp. 102 (D.C.Conn.
1953).
[5] It is true that there were voluminous depositions
taken on behalf of the defendants in each of the
cases. Yet the severity of the charges promulgated
by the plaintiffs, as well as the complexity of the
legal and factual issues in each case, justified such
lengthy and costly examination. The charge of fraud
requires very precise proof and it is understandable
that defendants went into great detail during the
depositions to ascertain the exact nature of
plaintiffs' charges. It should be borne in mind that
plaintiffs themselves initiated the actions; they
cannot now be heard to complain that defendants
made full use of legitimate pre-trial procedures.
[6] Plaintiffs argue that even if the costs of

depositions are to be taxed to them, their liability
should be limited to the cost of a single original
copy and not include the cost of duplicate copies
obtained from the convenience of counsel. In this
contention they are correct. Perlman v. Feldmann,
D.C., 116 F.Supp. 102 (D.C.Conn.1953); Hope
Basket Co. v. Product Advancement Corp., 104
F.Supp. 444 (W.D.Mich.1954); General Casualty
Co. of America v. Stanchfield, 23 F.R.D. 58
(D.C.Mont.1959).
It is not clear from the papers on the taxation of
costs whether any portion of the costs taxed for
depositions covers duplicate copies obtained for the
convenience of counsel. If it does, so much of such
costs as are attributable to duplicate copies should
be deleted. For this purpose the matter is remanded
to the Clerk for consideration of the facts.
4. Trial Transcripts
Plaintiffs also object to the costs of trial transcripts.
[7][8] The cost of transcripts of the trial testimony
may be taxed against the losing party when in the
Court's judgment such transcripts are necessary for
use in the case. Title 28 V.S.c. § 1920(2)
specifically authorizes the taxation of such costs,
stating that the judge or clerk may tax as costs 'fees
of the court reporters for all or any part of the
stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use
in the case.' The determinative consideration,
therefore, is whether the transcript was reasonably
necessary for 'use in the case.' Bank of America v.
Loew's International Corp., 163 F.Supp. 924
(S.D.N.Y.1958); Manley v. Canterbury Corp., 17
F.R.D. 234 (D.C.DeI.1955). In the instant case
testimony at the fraud trial lasted for over six weeks
and involved twelve different factual situations.
Moreover, since all the claims were interrelated to
some degree, it was necessary to have available the
testimony of prior witnesses in order to minimize
time-wasting disagreements as to what each witness
actually testified. Because of the anticipated length
and complexity of the trial, and since findings of
fact and conclusions of law were required to be
rendered at its conclusion, the Court, at a pre-trial
conference, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2),
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ordered that a transcript be made and the cost
included as part of the taxable costs of the case.
The multiplicity of the allegations and the length of
the testimony adduced at tria! served to reinforce
the Court's opinion that copies of the transcript for
both the Court and the parties *365 was a necessity,
not merely a convenience.

be taxed as costs against the plaintiffs. Defendants
assert that they chose these seven conferences
because they were devoted to limiting and clarifying
the issues and formulating a plan of trial
procedures. The remaining eight conferences were
not relevant in this regard and no attempt to tax
them is made.

[9] The Court concludes that the taxation of costs
for the trial transcript and for one copy obtained by
defendants for the use of counsel is proper. If
plaintiffs were charged for additional copies such
additional expenses are not properly taxable as
costs and the matter is remanded to the Clerk for
determination of that fact.

In this case the Court feels it must exercise its
discretion to tax the costs of pre-trial conference
transcripts since they played a vital part in the
progress of the lawsuit.
6. Witness Fees
The final item objected to in the taxation of costs
was the allowance of certain witness fees.

5. Pre-Trial Transcripts
Plaintiffs next object to the taxation of costs of
transcripts of pre-trial conferences.
[10][11] The cost of transcripts of pre-trial
conferences is taxable when such transcripts are
necessary for use in the case. In cases of this type
where the issues are varied and complicated,
pre-trial conferences play an important role in
narrowing and delineating the issues to be tried,
ascertaining the order of proof and generally laying
the groundwork for the trial itself. In the Bank of
America case, supra, this Court held:
'It is clear that the cost of the transcript of the
minutes of the pre-trial proceedings may be allowed
as a cost of the case, and particularly is this true
where
the
pre-trial
proceedings
devoted
considerable efforts to the limiting and clarifying of
issues, were conducted at considerable length and
where a proper understanding of the matters
covered and preparation of a pre-trial order could
not properly be had without a transcript thereof.'
163 F.Supp. 924, 931-932.

Pre-trial orders were often made a part of the
conference transcript, and in any case, a careful
reading of the transcript would have done much to
clarify the issues remaining for trial. Defendants
obtained and paid for a total of fifteen pre-trial
conference transcripts. Only seven are requested to

[12] Witness fees are properly includable as costs
of trial, pursuant to 28 U .S.c. § 1920(3). This is
true even where the witness is friendly and appears
voluntarily and is an officer of a corporate
defendant. Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research
Lab., 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1956); Perlman v.
Feldmann, 116 F.Supp. 102; Bennett Chemical Co.
v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd., 24 F.RD. 200
(D.C.N.Y.1959). In the case at bar several witness
fees were allowed for officers and employees of the
Carvel defendants. As indicated above, there is no
proscription against awarding costs for this reason.
[13][14] Plaintiffs object on the additional ground
that some witnesses for whom witness fees were
awarded were not merely officers or employees of
the defendant Carvel Corporation, but were
individually named and served as defendants. It is
true that witnesses who are real parties in interest
are not entitled to reimbursement or allowance for
their testimony. 6 Moore, Federal Practice §
54.77(5); Ryan v. Arabian American Oil Company,
18 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N. Y.1955). It appears that
there are five individuals on whose behalf witness
fees are requested who are also defendants in
certain actions. (Pierce, Giberman and Pazdro).
However, the record also indicates that three of
these five testified only in actions in which they are
not party defendants and the prohibitions against
granting witness fees as to these three would not be
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applicable. *366 The objection to witness fees
granted by the Clerk should be overruled.
Except to the extent that the matter is referred to
the Clerk for the ascertainment of facts as outlined
in the foregoing memorandum, the taxation of costs
made by the Clerk is affirmed. When the Clerk has
ascertained the facts as to the matters referred to
him, further taxation of costs should be made on
those items.
209 F.Supp. 361, 6 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1025
END OF DOCUMENT
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uncollected balance of hotel's accounts receivable
that existed as of first closing date and not as of
management transfer date.

Motions, Pleadings and Filings

[2] Vendor and Purchaser €::=196
400k 196 Most Cited Cases
Under amendment to hotel purchase agreement,
only those accounts receivable relating to period
after closing date which were on hand at closing
belonged to purchaser and thus seller had right to
use cash receipts during seller management period
for hotel operation regardless of what percentage of
hotel's revenues were derived from credit card sales;
after receipt of funds for credit card sales during
seller management period, accounts receivable
became "cash receipts" and thus were not accounts
receivable "on hand at closing."

United States District Court,
S.D. New York.
Jane H. GOLDMAN and Allan Howard Goldman,
as Executors Under the Last Will and
Testament of Sol Goldman, Deceased, Plaintiffs,
v.
Robert BURCH, Individually and as Trustee Under
Trust Known as GC-J Trust,
Defendant.
No. 87 Civ. 7189 (BN).
Jan. 13,1992.
Executors of estate of hotel purchaser sought to
recover amount allegedly overpaid for hotel. The
United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, 778 F.Supp. 781 entered
judgment in part for sellers and in part for
purchasers. Parties cross moved for relief. The
District Court, Newman, Senior Judge, sitting by
designation, held that: (I) purchasers were liable to
sellers for accounts receivable which existed on
date of closing; (2) hotel's cash receipts during
seller management period, whether or not derived
from accounts receivable, were available to seller to
pay hotel's biIls; and (3) sellers were entitled to
award of counsel fees as sellers were successful on
their counterclaims to substantially greater extent
than purchasers.
Ordered accordingly.
West Headnotes

[1) Vendor and Purchaser €::=79
400k79 Most Cited Cases
Under amendment to hotel purchase agreement,
purchaser was obligated to reimburse vendor for

[3J Vendor and Purchaser €::=196
400k196 Most Cited Cases
Under hotel purchase agreement, cash payments
received by hotel from account receivable debtors
during seller management period could be used by
seller to pay its bills received in normal course of
business, including bills resulting from preseller
management period expenses.
[4J Vendor and Purchaser €::=196
400k196 Most Cited Cases
Hotel's cash receipts received during seller
management period, whether or not derived initially
from accounts receivable, were available to seller
for payment of old bills received in ordinary course
of business, for expenses accruing either before or
after closing date; all cash receipts and
disbursements during that period were factors in
computing net profits in accordance with agreement
and generally accepted principles of cash basis
accounting.
[5J Vendor and Purchaser €::=196
400k196 Most Cited Cases
Under hotel purchase agreement,

"net profits"
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included all expenses which hotel paid during seller
management period whether those expenses accrued
prior to or during that period.
[6] Vendor and Purchaser €:=341(3)
400k341(3) Most Cited Cases
Corroborated testimony of trustee of seller
supported finding that seller had made working
capital advance to hotel purchaser, although
unexplained failure of trustee to produce
documentary
evidence
from
hotel's
bank
establishing wire transfer bore on weight and
credibility of testimony and other evidence; trustee's
testimony and that of hotel's assistant controller
showed that advance was transferred by wire to
bank, for purposes of determining extent of amounts
owed to purchaser for alleged overpayment.
[7] Vendor and Purchaser €:=202
400k202 Most Cited Cases
Hotel purchase agreement showed that vendor and
purchaser agreed explicitly and unconditionally on
prorations and adjustments and thus vendor was
entitled to receive apportionment credits in
conformity with section of agreement covering
prorations and adjustments of expenses that were
paid by seller during seller management period.
[8] Federal Civil Procedure €:=2737.5
170Ak2737.5 Most Cited Cases
Seller of hotel was entitled to award of reasonable
counsel fees in action stemming from sale of hotel;
seller was successful under its counterclaims to
substantially greater extent than were purchasers on
their complaint.
[9] Federal Civil Procedure €:=2737.5
170Ak2737.5 Most Cited Cases
Trustee of seller of hotel was not entitled to award
of counsel fees as "prevailing party" in his
individual capacity in action stemming from sale,
although seller was prevailing party, as trustee was
not party to purchase agreement which was
contractual predicate for fee shifting award of
counsel fees, even though suit against trustee
individually was frivolous.
[10] Vendor and Purchaser €:=31

400k31 Most Cited Cases
Error in hotel purchase agreement in making
reference to local law governing fire protection
systems for buildings other than hotels did not
release seller from its obligation to reimburse
purchasers for installing required fire protection
system.
[11] Federal Civil Procedure €:=2658
170Ak2658 Most Cited Cases
Cross motion made within ten business days after
entry of judgment was timely. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rules 6(a, b), 52(b), 28 U .S.C.A.
*1442 Stephen H. Penn & Associates, Noel W.
Hauser, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Mitchell A. Karlan,
New York City, for defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
NEWMAN, Senior Judge, United States Court of
International Trade, sitting as a United States
District Court Judge by Designation:
INTRODUCTION
The parties, asserting various errors in the court's
Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
dated November 25, 1991, 778 F.Supp. 781 (1991),
and the judgment entered thereon dated November
29, 1991, have cross-moved for relief under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b), 59(a) and (e). Additionally,
plaintiffs seek a new trial to adduce additional
evidence regarding the Trust's claim of a $500,000
cash advance to the Hotel by wire transfer for
working capital.
For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs' applications
are denied in toto; defendant's applications are
granted in part.
DISCUSSION
I.
Plaintiffs contend that the court erred in holding:
"the plaintiff [sic] is [sic] absolutely obligated to
pay the defendant an amount equal to the total of
accounts receivable in favor of the Hotel as of the
Management Transfer Date, September 30, 1987."
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Affirmation of Noel W Hauser, dated December 5,
1991, par. 4 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs further
argue that the accounts receivable in question for
which the court determined plaintiffs had an
obligation to reimburse the Trust relate only to the
period after May IS, 1987, which accounts
according to plaintiff belonged to Goldman under §
7(a) of the Amendment. *1443 Finally, plaintiffs
claim that the court's award to defendant of
$50,774.86 for accounts receivable is unsupported
by the record. Accordingly, plaintiffs request that
the court subtract $50,774.86 from the sum awarded
to the Trust. The request is denied.
[I] Counsel for plaintiffs has misread the court's
opinion. The court did not hold that plaintiffs are
liable to the Trust for accounts receivable as of the
Management Transfer Date, September 30, 1987.
Rather, the court determined that pursuant to § 7(a)
of the Amendment, after the Management Transfer
Date (viz., September 30, 1987) Goldman was
obligated to reimburse the Trust $50,774.86 for the
uncollected balance of accounts receivable that
existed as of the First Closing, May 15, 1987.
Plaintiffs concede that after the Management
Transfer Date the Trust was entitled to the
uncollected balance of accounts receivable existing
as of the First Closing--May 15, 1987.
Burch's credible and uncontradicted testimony
(Burch, Tr. 106) and the figures shown in plaintiffs'
exhibits 5 and 6 (based on the books and records of
the Hotel) establish that the accounts receivable as
of the First Closing (May IS, 1987) amounted to
$850,623.55 and that by the Management Transfer
Date (September 30, 1987) the Trust had withdrawn
$799,848.69 from the Hotel during the Seller
Management Period, leaving a balance due the
Trust for uncollected accounts receivable of
$50,774.86. Consequently, the court adheres to its
prior award to the Trust of the balance of accounts
receivable that existed as of May IS, 1987, to which
the Trust was entitled under § 7.
II.
Plaintiffs persist in their challenge to the Trust's
right pursuant to the Amendment to use revenues
generated by the Hotel during the Seller

Management Period to pay bills received during
such period for expenses incurred prior to that
period. In further support of their position,
plaintiffs have annexed an affidavit dated December
5, 1991 executed by Paul Underhill, Goldman's
representative at the Hotel during the Seller
Management Period. Ostensibly, the affidavit calls
to the court's attention controlling new facts.
[2] According to Underhill's affidavit, a substantial
percentage of the Hotel's sales of food, lodging, and
other services were credit card transactions and
other accounts receivable rather than cash receipts.
Plaintiffs maintain that since under § 7(a) accounts
receivable generated by the Trust after the First
Closing for sales during the Seller Management
Period belonged to Goldman, Burch had no right to
pay pre-Seller Management Period expenses out of
Hotel revenues, thus reducing "Net Profits" as
defined in § 2.
[3] Plaintiffs' argument ignores the fact that under §
7(a), only those accounts receivable relating to the
period after May 15, 1987 "which are on hand at
closing" (emphasis added) belonged to Goldman
(Burch, Tr. 93-4). That stipulation is clearly
indicative of the Trust's right to use cash receipts
during the Seller Management Period for Hotel
operations. Regardless of what percentage of the
Hotel's revenues were derived from credit card sales
and thus were initially on the Hotel's books as
accounts receivable, after receipt of funds from the
banks for credit card sales during the Seller
Management Period, the accounts receivable
became "cash receipts" and obviously were not
accounts receivable "on hand at closing." After
receipt by the Hotel of cash payments from the
accounts receivable debtors during the Seller
Management Period, such cash receipts were
properly used by the Trust for payment of its bills
received in the normal course of business during the
Seller Management Period, including bills resulting
fi'om pre-seller Management Period expenses.
Such
cash
disbursements
reduced
Seller
Management Period "Net Profits" in accordance
with § 2 of the Amendment and with principles of
cash basis accounting.
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[4] Thus, even accepting the facts recited in the
Underhill affidavit, the court adheres to its previous
ruling that the Hotel's *1444 "cash receipts" during
the Seller Management Period (whether or not
derived initially from accounts receivable) were
available to the Trust for payment of all bills
received in the ordinary course of business, whether
for expenses accruing before or on and after May
16, 1987. All cash receipts and disbursements
during the Seller Management Period were factors
in the computation of "Net Profits" in accordance
with the definition thereof in § 2 and in accordance
with generally accepted principles of cash basis
accounting. Conversely, under § 7(a), any Seller
Management Period accounts receivable still on
hand at closing (viz., uncollected receivables)
belonged to Goldman, and since accounts
receivable were neither cash receipts nor cash
disbursements, they were not relevant to the
calculation of "Net Profits" under § 2 or under cash
basis accounting principles.

Amendment.
As pointed up in the original opmlOn concerning
accounting methodology, counsel for plaintiffs
questioned his witness Breger at trial specifically
concerning the method of accounting he had
discussed with Burch--cash basis or accrual
basis--and attorney Breger (who negotiated and
reviewed the Amendment on behalf of Goldman)
testified unequivocally on direct examination that
the method he discussed was "on a cash basis"
(Breger, Tr. 43).
Plaintiffs now disingenuously attempt, in a
back-handed fashion, to impeach the testimony of
Breger, a veteran business lawyer, on his
understanding of the distinction between cash basis
and accrual accounting. Plaintiffs have not even
submitted an affidavit by Breger supporting their
bald allegation that his understanding of cash basis
accounting
differed
from
the
fundamental
accounting sense.

As was stressed in the original opmIOn, a critical
issue in the determination of the "net profits" of a
business within a certain time-frame is the method
of accounting agreed upon by the parties.
Inexplicably, in the case of the Amendment, which
obviously received close scrutiny by counsel for
Burch and Goldman, there is no definitive
agreement regarding the accounting method for the
determination of "Net Profits."

There is no suggestion in the record that in
determining the "net profits" of a Hotel, the terms
"cash basis" and "accrual basis" accounting have a
special meaning in the Uniform System of Hotel
Accounting that differs from generally accepted
accounting
principles.
Moreover,
the
authoritativeness of the "Uniform System" as an
accounting "bible" for the hotel industry is largely
emasculated by the fact that "nobody completely
abides by it" (Coords, Tr. 232).

[5] Arguably, the "bare bones" definition of "Net
Profits" in § 2 of the Amendment--in essence, cash
receipts less cash disbursements--strongly suggests
that cash basis accounting was intended by the
parties to the Amendment, but the definition is not
explicit in that regard. On the basis that the
definition of "Net Profits" in the Amendment was
ambiguous, plaintiffs sought, successfully, rulings,
initially from Judge Cedarbaum and after
reassignment of this case, from the writer, avoiding
the strictures of the Parol Evidence Rule. Thus, at
trial, the parties were permitted to establish the
intent of Goldman (who was deceased at the time of
trial) and Burch by the context in which the term
was used, the situation of the parties and the
surrounding circumstances pertaining to the

III.
[6] Plaintiffs contend that the court's finding of a
$500,000 working capital advance by the Trust is
"not supported by anything of record" and therefore
is "clearly erroneous" (plfts' motion, par. 18). Such
contention is frivolous since it ignores the
uncontradicted and credible testimony of Burch
corroborated by that of Leyco, the Hotel's assistant
controller, showing the advance was transferred by
wire to the Hotel's bank, Manufacturers Hanover.
[FN1] *1445 See Burch, Tr. 104-107, 156, 162;
Leyco, Tr. 13, 53-55, 67, 69-70; Coords, Tr. 202,
204, 217-18, 236, 243-44; plfts' exh. 5 ("Working
Capital") and 6 ($150,000 "net advances by seller"),
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24,25; and deft's exh. 5.
FNI. Plaintiffs' own witness, Leyco,
testified:
Q. [YJou know, do you not, from our own
personal knowledge that Mr Burch during
September, 1987 did in fact contribute
$500,000 working capital to the Hotel
Dorset business, correct?
A. $500,000 was bank wired sometime III
September 1987, yes. Leyco, Tr. 69.
The Amendment contemplated that Burch could
make a working capital advance if Goldman failed
to do so and that such advance by the Trust would
be reimbursed with interest (deft's exh. B, § 7( d);
Burch, Tr. 63-64, 95. Understandably, if the
advance was transferred by wire directly to the
Hotel's bank, the advance might not appear in the
Hotel's cash schedule or other records of cash
receipts, including cash received shown on the daily
reports. Of course, defendant's unexplained failure
to produce documentary evidence from the Hotel's
bank establishing the wire transfer bears on the
weight and credibility of the testimonial and other
evidence submitted by defendant. Nonetheless, the
court concludes that on the issue of the working
capital advance by the Trust, Burch's corroborated
testimony was sufficient to make a finding in favor
of the Trust. Reopening the case for additional
evidence on the working capital issue, as requested
by plaintiffs, is entirely unwarranted.

IV.
[7] In the original opinion, 778 F.Supp. at 789, the
court determined that when the Agreement
providing for the prorations was executed, the
parties did not contemplate a Seller Management
Period or reduction in purchase price by "Net
Profits," as thereafter provided for in § 2 of the
Amendment. Hence, the court concluded that
under the Amendment, the parties did not intend
that the Trust should receive both apportionment
credits in conformity with § 5.01 of the Agreement
and a reduction of "Net Profits" for expenses paid
out of Hotel revenues during the Seller
Management Period under § 2.

Defendant now urges, and the court is constrained
to
agree, that the
parties had precisely
apportionment of the § 5.0 I expenses in mind when
they reiterated in §§ 5(e) and 6(d) of the
Amendment that there be prorations as provided in §
5.01--ostensibly
following
the
parties'
understanding that during the SeIler Management
Period, the Hotel and its revenues still belonged to
the Trust, not Goldman. Accordingly, the Trust
maintains that it should recover the sum of
$254,632.31 for the § 5.0 I prorations and
adjustment of expenses that were paid by the Trust
out of Seller Management Period revenues and
benefitted Goldman after September 30, 1987.
In the Amendment, Burch and Goldman agreed
explicitly, unqualifiedly and unconditionally on
prorations and adjustments under § 5.01, without
excepting expenses paid by the Trust out of Hotel
revenues during the Seller Management Period. "A
court may not rewrite into a contract conditions the
parties did not insert or, under the guise of
interpretation, add or excise terms ... " Marine

Associates v. New Suffolk Development CO/p., 125
A.D.2d 649,510 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (2d Dept.J986)

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court
modifies its fonner determination regarding the
prorations under § 5.01 and now, awards the Trust
an additional $254,632.3 I to be added to the net
amount of the judgment previously awarded to the
Trust
on
its
counteriaims--$70,787.92
plus
prejudgment interest.
V.
[8] Defendant asserts that the court erroneously
denied it an award of its counsel fees in accordance
with § 14(e) the Agreement as the "prevailing
party," citing Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047,
1058 (10th Cir.1990); StudiengesellschaJt Kohle v.
Eastman Kodak, 713 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir.1983);
Solow v. Wellner, 150 Misc.2d 642, 569 N.Y.S.2d
882, 888 (Civ.Ct.1991). See also 10 Wright,
Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §
2667, p. 191 (1983) ("a successful counterclaimant
generally will be considered the prevailing party
when plaintiff fails to recover or is awarded less
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than
defendant
receives
on
*1446
the
counterclaim"). On reconsideration of defendant's
request for counsel fees, the court concludes on the
basis of the authorities called to its attention that
since defendant has overwhelmingly succeeded
under its counterclaims and to a substantially
greater extent than did plaintiffs on their complaint,
the Trust is entitled to be awarded its reasonable
counsel fees.
VI.
[9] Defendant Burch in his individual capacity also
requests an award of attorney's fees inasmuch as his
motion for summary judgment of dismissal was
granted by Judge Cedarbaum. Although Judge
Cedarbaum found that there was no justification for
suing Burch individually and such suit was
frivolous (March 23, 1990 transcript, p. 21-22),
unfortunately Burch's request (in his individual
capacity) for counsel fees as the "prevailing party"
must be denied. Burch in his individual capacity
although a party to this lawsuit was not a party to
the Agreement, which is a contractual predicate for
a fee-shifting award of counsel fees to the
"prevailing party." However, since an award of
costs to the prevailing party is provided by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d), Burch is awarded costs in both
his individual capacity and capacity as Trustee.
VII.
[10] The court does not concur with defendant's
argument, previously addressed in the original
opinion, that because § 17 of the Agreement refers
to Local Law 5, the Trust was not obligated to
reimburse Goldman for installing a fire system in
compliance with Local Law 16. It was previously
mentioned that Local Law 5 applies to buildings
other than Hotels. The court may readily infer
from the context of the provision that both parties
intended the inept reference to "the balance of
Local Law 5" (Agreement, § 17, emphasis added)
as merely a short-hand description for additional

fire alarm system work in the Hotel reqUired by the
New York City fire code.
Since Local Law 5 applies to fire protection
systems, but in buildings other than hotels,
defendant's literal reading of the contract to refer to

reimbursement to Goldman for only work under
Local Law 5 simply ignores the substance of their
agreement and attempts to take advantage of an
error in citing the applicable Local Law.
Defendant's argument results in ascribing to the
parties an intent to provide a meaningless and
ineffectual-- indeed absurd-- agreement regarding
reimbursement to Goldman for fire alarm system
work. Fundamentally, a literal reading of contract
language should be eschewed by the court where
such interpretation makes the provision in question
absurd or meaningless, and the substance of parties'
agreement may be gleaned and effectuated
consistently
with
their
obvious
intent.
Accordingly, the court adheres to original findings
and conclusions.
VlII.
[11] Finally, plaintiffs contend that defendant's
cross-motion, filed on December 13, 1991 is
untimely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b) since it was not
made within the ten days after the entry of judgment
permitted by the rule, and that the ten day period
may not be extended by the court under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). Defendant, however, has not
requested an extension of time under Rule 6(b) and
maintains, correctly, that its cross-motion filed on
December 13, 1991 was made within ten business
days after entry of judgment on November 29,
1991, and is therefore timely under Fed.R.Civ.P.
6(a).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The judgment entered on November 29, 1991 is
hereby vacated and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as set forth in the opinion of
November 25, 1991 are modified to the extent
indicated supra.
2. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order
the Trust shall file in this court and serve plaintiffs
with an application for an award of counsel fees
with *1447 supporting documentation. Plaintiffs
may respond to such application within twenty (20)
days after service of the application; defendant may
thereafter file and serve a reply within five (5) days
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after service of plaintiffs' response.
780 F.Supp. 1441

Motions, Pleadings and Filings (Back to top)
• 1:87 cv07189 (Docket)
(Oct. 07, 1987)
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[31 Federal Civil Procedure 0=>2621
170Ak2621 Most Cited Cases

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri,
Western Division.
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff,
v.
Joseph P. JACOBSON, Defendant.
No. 12345-1.

[3] Federal Civil Procedure 0=>2742.1
170Ak2742.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 170Ak2742)
Entry of judgment and taxation of costs are entirely
separate legal acts. 28 U .S.C.A. § 1920;
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 58, 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.Ct.
of App. 8th Cir. rule 17, 28 U.S.C.A.;
U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules W.D.Mo., rule 4.

June II, 1965.
Surety's action to recover on indemnity agreement.
The District Court, John W. Oliver, 1., held that
defendants who were granted costs by Court of
Appeals which had reversed action of District Court
in granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
were entitled, on remand at which summary
judgment was again entered for plaintiff to
execution for amount of costs taxed rather than
having amount of costs offset against monetary
judgment awarded plaintiff in excess of costs.

[4) Federal Civil Procedure 0=>2748
170Ak2748 Most Cited Cases
Defendants who had been granted costs by Court of
Appeals, which had reversed action of district court
in granting plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment, were entitled on remand, at which
summary judgment was again entered for plaintiff,
to execution for amount of costs taxed rather than
having amount of costs offset against monetary
judgment awarded plaintiff in excess of costs. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1920; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 58, 28
U.S.C.A.; U.S.Ct. of App. 8th Cir. rule 17, 28
U.S.C.A.; U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules W.D.Mo., rule 4.
*427 Rodger J. Walsh, Kansas City, Mo., for
plaintiff.

Judgment for plaintiff in accordance with opinion.
West Headnotes

[1] Federal Courts 0=>951.1
170Bk951.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 170Bk951, 106k406.9(18))
Where defendant, on remand of case after district
court's action in sustaining plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment had been reversed by Court of
Appeals, elected to produce no further evidence and
defense counsel after having been given opportunity
to examine plaintiffs files after close of trial on
remand stated he still did not have any defense,
summary judgment was again entered for plaintiff.

John M. Cleary, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.

JOHN W. OLIVER, District Judge.
Our earlier action sustaining plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment was reversed by the Court of
Appeals in Jacobson v. Maryland Casualty
Company, 8th Cir. 1964, 336 F.2d 72, cert. denied
379 U.S. 964, 85 S.Ct. 655, 13 L.Ed.2d 558, for
reasons there stated.

12] Courts 0=>96(4)
106k96(4) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 106k96)
District Court has duty to follow mandate of Court
of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals held that the pre-trial
procedures followed by this Court did 'not justify
the trial court in refusing [defendant] his day in
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court, particularly on the issue of his affinnative
defense, as well as as any other issue not shown by
the record to be a sham, frivolous or so
unsubstantial that a trial would obviously be futile:
In compliance with the portion of the mandate of
the Court of Appeals remanding this case for further
proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion, we
afforded the defendant the day in court that our
controlling court held had been refused him.
Defendant elected not to use that day any differently
than he used the other days he has spent in our
Court. The defendant did cross-examine the
witnesses called by the plaintiff to re-establish its
prima facie case on remand but *428 he called no
witnesses of his own and introduced no evidence
whatever. [FN 1]
FN I. The transcript of the trial on remand
shows the following question and answer
directed by the Court to counsel for the
defendant:
THE COURT: Let me ask you if you have
any evidence that you would wish to
adduce in connection with the presentation
of any alleged defenses in regard to Mr.
Jacobson's case? The Court of Appeals
indicated that they felt that Mr. Jacobson
had been denied his day in this court, and I
want to make certain that he has his day in
this court, and that it appear of record that
full opportunity has been given him, * * *
Now, do you have any evidence at all to
introduce here today?
MR.
CLEARY
[counsel
for
the
defendant]: I have no evidence to
introduce today, Your Honor.
During the course of the trial on remand we
required that plaintiff made available to counsel for
the defendant its entire office file of any and all
matters connected with plaintiffs cause of action in
order to afford defendant's counsel an additional
'opportunity to examine them [all of plaintiffs office
files] to see whether or not he can ferret out any
affinnative defense from those records.'
Defendant's counsel was given a two week period

after the close of the trial on remand within which
to accomplish that task. Defendant's counsel
reported to the Court at the end of that period that,
he had made a full examination of all of plaintiffs
records and that he stilI did not have any defense to
plaintiffs cause of action and that he had found no
evidence in plaintiffs files to support any alleged
affinnative defense.
[1] The judgment heretofore entered on plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment in accordance with
our earlier pre-trial procedures will again be entered
because we believe the procedures we have
followed on remand have been consistent with the
mandate of our controlling Court.
A real dispute between the
been created by that portion
Court of Appeals that taxed
the plaintiff on the appeal.
question.

parties, however, has
of the mandate of the
appellate costs against
We tum now to that

The last part of the Court of Appeals' mandate
provided that:
And it is further Ordered by this Court that
Joseph P. Jacobson have and recover against
Maryland Casualty Company the sum of Three
Hundred, Seventy-six and 6211 OO--Dollars for its
costs in this behalf expended and have execution
therefor.
Shortly before the date we set this case for the trial
on remand, plaintiff filed a motion for a stay of
proceedings to enforce the quoted portion of the
Court of Appeals' mandate. Conferences between
the Court and counsel for both parties had revealed
(a) that defendant still did not have any known
defense to plaintiffs cause of action; [FN2] and (b)
that plaintiffs counsel was personally obligated to
E. L. Mendenhall Brief Printing Company for the
cost of printing the record on appeal. [FN3]
FN2. As is apparent from footnote 2 of the
Court of Appeals opinion, this was not the
first time that defendant had advised this
Court that there never has been any real
dispute about the facts of this case and that
the alleged affirmative defense as pleaded
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by the defendant was only a 'paper' defense.
FN3. That fact, and the further fact that
defendant's counsel advised us in his most
recent brief that defendant lives in Canada
and that defendant's counsel 'has not been
able to get him to respond to
correspondence or telephone calls in his
efforts to be paid for said record on appeal
(or even for other expenses)' are facts
totally without significance in regard to the
determination of the question relating to
costs that has arisen since the remand of
this case from the Court of Appeals.
As a result of those conferences, the parties agreed
that each would write the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals to ascertain whether the $376.62 costs
taxed by *429 the Court of Appeals should or
should not be offset against the judgment that both
parties acknowledged should again be entered for
the plaintiff.
Counsel for the defendant wrote the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals and requested that an execution be
issued by that Court. In his letter, defendant's
counsel stated that: 'It is apparent that in all
probability the Maryland Casualty Company will
obtain a judgment for more than the amount of the
costs' and added that 'the request for an execution is
made in order to determine whether such execution
can be obtained before a final judgment in the case.'
Counsel for the plaintiff stated in his letter that:
The question involved in this matter is whether
Maryland Casualty Company should pay Joseph
P. Jacobson the sum of $376.62 under your
court's mandate before the District Court enters a
final judgment, after trial, against Jacobson for
Maryland in excess of these costs, or whether the
District Court can set off the sum of $376.62
against the prospective judgment in Maryland's
favor against Jacobson.
I am of the opinion that the cost mandate of this
Court can be used as a set-off in the judgment
against Jacobson or it can be a partial satisfaction
of the judgment. * * *

***

I therefore respectfully request a stay of execution
in this matter until the District Court enters a final
judgment under Rule 54.
The Clerk of the Court of Appeals replied to both
letters as follows:
These two letters have been distributed to the
panel of judges before whom this appeal was
submitted and I have been directed to write you
as follows: The mandate of this Court in which
we provided for taxation of costs in the District
Court was in our usual form and in accord with
our regular practice. This Court has no process to
enforce execution as does the District Court and
the Court declines to issue execution as requested
by Mr. Cleary [counsel for the defendant].
The fact that the Court of Appeals refused
defendant's request for execution and the fact that it
also refused plaintiffs request for a stay of
execution left the question for our determination.
We requested authorities from both sides.
Plaintiff now relies upon Rule 54(b) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, although he based his original
motion for a stay on Rule 62 of those Rules. Neither
of those Rules, in our judgment, touch the question.
Nor were the cases cited by defendant, in our
judgment, close to the point; they need not be
discussed.
Independent research, however, has convinced us
that plaintiffs motion to stay execution should be
denied and that the costs taxed by the Court of
Appeals should be paid defendant in spite of the
fact that plaintiff may never be able to collect a
single cent of its judgment. [FN4]
FN4. Plaintiff argues in its last brief that
'it is unfortunate that defendant's counsel
owes the printer but the Court of Appeals'
mandate was not in favor of the
defendant's counsel and in all equity the
plaintiff should not have to expend more
money for defendant's benefit than it has
already.' Plaintiff added: That defendant's
counsel cannot collect from his own client
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for his fees and expenses augers a dim
future for plaintiff in ever collecting on its
own judgment.' Those arguments are as
irrelevant as the argument made by the
defendant that we noted in footnote 3.
[2] The point of beginning is the recognition of the
duty of this Court to follow the mandate of our
Court of Appeals. The following language of Judge
Sambom from Thornton v. Carter, 8th Cir. 1940,
109 F.2d 316, 319, was *430 most recently quoted
with approval in Paull v. Archer-Daniels-Midland
Company, 8th Cir. 1963,313 F.2d 612,617:
'When a case has been decided by this court on
appeal and remanded to the District Court, every
question which was before this court and
disposed of by its decree is finally settled and
detennined. The District Court is bound by the
decree and must carry it into execution according
to the mandate. It cannot alter it, examine it
except for purposes of execution, or give any
further or other relief or review it for apparent
error with respect to any question decided on
appeal, and can only enter a judgment or decree
in strict compliance with the opinion and
mandate.'
In dealing with questions relating to the entry of
judgment and the taxation of costs, recognition must
also be made of the fact that neither the applicable
statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1920), the rules of various
courts (Rule 17 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit and Local Rule 4 of this
Court) nor the rules of decision announced in the
few cases that discuss questions of taxation of costs
are phrased with what Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of
Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 287, 65 S.Ct. 1157, 89
L.Ed. 1611 (1945), [FN5] called a 'fastidious
precision' oflanguage.
FN5. The paucity of reported cases that
relate to the taxation of costs, both in the
trial
and
the
appellate
courts
is
undoubtedly due to the fact that, except
under unusual circumstances, the taxation
of costs is not an appealable order. In
order to afford plaintiff the opportunity to

appeal our ruling on the taxation of costs
question we are including that ruling in our
final judgment.
[3] It is clear, however, that the Rules of Civil
Procedure now expressly recognize that the entry of
a judgment and the taxation of costs are entirely
separate legal acts. The failure to make express
recogmtlOn of that proposition prompted an
amendment to Rule 58 in the year 1946 by the
addition of a sentence in that rule that '[the] entry of
the judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of
costs.' That added sentence in the 1946 amendment
was carried over in its entirety when present Rule 58
was amended in 1963.
As the cases cited by the Advisory Committee on
Rules in support of the 1946 amendment imply, and
as the cases to which we shall call attention hold,
courts that have been called upon to pass upon
questions of costs have consistently recognized that
questions relating to the taxation of costs,
particularly to the taxation of costs by an appellate
court, are not to be confused with questions that
relate to the merits of an appeal or with questions
that relate to the validity or invalidity of an actual
judgment rendered by the trial court.
For a collection of the cases that relate to 'the
award of costs by appellate court as affected by
subsequent proceedings or course of action in the
lower court,' see the annotation under that title in
116 A.L.R. 1152.
The Federal cases are clear and consistent. The
leading case in the federal courts was decided by
Judge and later Justice Lurton. It is Scatcherd v.
Love, 6 Cir. 1908, 166 F. 53.
The first trial in that case resulted in a verdict for
the defendant. The plaintiff was successful in the
first appeal. Appellate costs were therefore taxed
against defendant. After remand the case was
settled and the trial court taxed the appellate costs,
together with other costs, against the defendant.
Judge Lurton held that the '[c]osts paid by plaintiff
* * * in obtaining a review, are costs which the
plaintiff is entitled to recover' (I. c. 56 of 166 F.).
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He held that '[t]his is true * * * for the * * * reason
that the costs of the fonner writ of error were
adjudged by this court [i. e. the Court of Appeals]
against the defendant * * * and the judgment was
made the judgment of the *431 court below' (I. c. 57
of 166 F.). That case emphasized that '[t]his
judgment [for appellate costs made by the appellate
court] was beyond the control of the court below,
regardless of the final result of the case' (I. c. 57 of
166 F.).
The cases of Berthold v. Burton, S.D.N.Y.1909,
169 F. 495, and Jennings v. Burton, S.D.N.Y.1910,
177 F. 603, presented a situation not dissimilar from
the present posture ofthis case.

F.2d 292, 293, and in Broffe v. Horton, 2nd Cir.
1949, 173 F.2d 565. The Broffe case, in tum, was
followed most recently in Steams v. Tinker &
Rasor, 9th Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 589, 606.
We shall follow this line of cases. Final judgment
will therefore be entered in favor of the plaintiff on
the merits. That judgment will include a provision
that will order execution in favor of defendant for
the $376.62 costs taxed in defendant's favor by the
Court of Appeals unless plaintiff voluntarily makes
that payment within ten (10) days.
37 F.R.D. 427
END OF DOCUMENT

In that case plaintiffs recovered a judgment on the
first trial. That judgment was reversed by the Court
of Appeals and costs of appeal were taxed by the
appellate court against the plaintiff. Those costs
were then paid. Plaintiff, as plaintiff in this case,
was also successful in the second trial but, in
connection with the taxation of costs after the
second trial, he sought to have allowed his payment
of the appellate costs as a 'disbursement' and
therefore included as a part of the costs taxed after
the second trial the money he had paid for the costs
taxed against him in the appellate court in
connection with the successful appeal of the first
trial.
Plaintiffs request was denied because the court
held that 'to allow reimbursement in the way
suggested would practically be to annul its [the
Court of Appeals] decision.'
[4] Should we allow plaintiff in this case to offset
the amount of appellate costs taxed against it by the
Court of Appeals, we would, as a practical matter,
prevent defendant from recovering the costs taxed
by the Court of Appeals and would in effect annul
that action taken by our controlling court. Cf.
Parkerson v. Borst, 5th Cir. 1919,256 F. 827,828,
and Miller v. C. C. Hartwell Co., 5th Cir. 1921, 271
F. 385, 389-390.
The two Burton cases cited above were followed in
Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 2nd Cir. 1937, 93
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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COUNTY
P. SPIERING, DEPUTY

Julie Klein Fischer
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
DAIRY, LLC,

Plaintiffs,
-vsBEL TMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a
BELTMAN WELDING AND
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington
corporation;

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL
Fee Category: A-l
Filing Fee: $77.00

)

Defendant.

)

COME NOW, CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT DAIRY, LLC (hereinafter
referred to as "Plaintiffs"), the above-named Plaintiffs, and for their claims for relief and causes
of action against the Defendant, BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC. d/b/a BELTMAN

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1

4

ORIGINAL

WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION, a Washington corporation ("Beltman"), COMPLAIN
AND ALLEGE as follows:

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff Charles DeGroot at all times relevant herein was a resident of Canyon

County, Idaho.
2.

Plaintiff DeGroot Dairy, LLC is an Idaho LLC \vith its principal place of business

in Canyon County Idaho.
3.

Plaintiffs are "Buyers" within the meaning of Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-

4.

Defendant Beltman is a Washington corporation doing business in Canyon

103.

County, Idaho. At the time the acts and omissions complained of herein occurred, Beltman was
doing business as Beltman Welding and Construction.
5.

Defendant Beltman is a "Seller" within the meaning of Idaho Commercial Code §

28-2-103.
6.

This court has jurisdiction over Beltman pursuant to Idaho Code § S-S14( a).

7.

Venue is proper in Canyon County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404

because Defendant does not reside in Idaho and the causes of action complained of herein arose
in Canyon County, Idaho.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
8.

Plaintiffs own and operate a 2,000+ head dairy in Canyon County, Idaho.

9.

In June 1999, Plaintiff Charles "Chuck" DeGroot entered into a contract with

Beltman for the construction of a dairy facility near Melba, Canyon County, Idaho. Attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference is a true and correct copy of said
contract.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
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10.

Pursuant to the contract, Defendant was to construct a dairy facility including the

following:

two (2) free stall sheds, including lockups (only one of which was to be built

immediately); a dry shed, maternity and sick shed, including lockups; fences and gates; service
alleys, loading chute and catch pens behind the barn; plumbing; asphalt area by the commodity
shed and silage area; gravel driveways; a manure handling system; and heifer corrals, including
lockups.
11.

The total cost of the dairy facility was set at $2,095,828.00 to be paid as follmvs:

down payment of $50,000.00; six (6) monthly payments of $240,000.00 beginning July 10, 1999
and ending on December 10, 1999; the balance of $665,828.00 to be paid in three (3) payments
of $160,000.00 at the start of construction on the second free stall and heifer corrals (weather
permitting); and $125,828 due upon completion.
12.

In about July or August 1999, Defendant subcontracted the engineering, design

and installation of manure handling equipment to Standley Trenching, Inc. d/b/a Standley & Co.
("Standley") for Plaintiffs' dairy constructed in Canyon County, Idaho. Standley is a distributor
of manure handling equipment manufactured by Houle & Fils, Inc. ("Houle").
13.

The equipment and products sold by Defendant to Plaintiffs are "goods" within

the meal1lng of Idaho Commercial Code §§ 28-2-105 and/or 28-2-107.

Said goods include

without limitation "goods" manufactured by Houle.
14.

Defendant collected from Plaintiffs and in tum paid Standley in excess of

$100,000 for engineering, designing and installing manure handling equipment (including Houle
equipment) at Plaintiffs' dairy.
15.

At

all

relevant

times,

Plaintiffs

relied

upon

Defendant's

knowledge,

representations, expertise and experience to design and construct a properly functioning dairy for
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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Plaintiffs. In connection with this, Plaintiffs relied on Defendant to hire subcontractors who
would provide goods and services free of defects.
16.

The manure handling equipment installed at the Plaintiffs' dairy by Standley at

the direction and request of Defendant is inadequate, does not function as intended, and is not fit
for its intended use.
17.

Because of the defects and deficiencies in the manure handling system installed

by Standley at the direction and request of Defendant, Plaintiffs v,·ere required to contract
directly with Standley to modify and renovate the manure handling equipment. The amount
charged for said "renovation" work exceeds $35,000.
COUNT ONE

Breach of Contract

18.

PlaintifIs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 17 above.
19.

In connection with the contract for Plaintiffs' purchase of their dairy facility,

Defendant promised to constmct the dairy facility in a vvorkmanlike manner and to provide a
dairy facility free of defects in constmction.
20.

Plaintiffs paid Defendant in excess of $2,000,000.00 for the construction of

Plaintiffs' dairy facility.
21.

Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiffs by failing to construct the dairy in

a workmanlike manner, resulting in numerous defects in the operation of the dairy, particularly
with respect to the manure handling system installed by Standley at the direction and request of
Defendant.
22.

Plaintiffs have been required to spend over $35,000 repairing, renovating and

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4

modifying the defective/inadequate manure handling system installed by Standley, which
amount is in excess of the total cost of the improperly functioning system. Despite Plaintiffs
efforts to renovate and repair the system installed by Standley, the system still does not function
properly and/or does not perform as contracted.
23.

Plaintiffs have suffered consequential damages as a direct and proximate result of

Defendant's breach in an exact amount to be proven at trial.
24.

As a direct result of Defendant's breach of contract, Plaintiffs suffered damages in

an amount to be proven at trial, but which amount exceeds $150,000.
25.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of the law firm of White

Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121.
COUNTT\VO

Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

26.

Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 25 above.
27.

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in the contract between

Plaintiffs and Defendant.
28.

The covenant requires Defendant to act in good faith, with fairness and with

honesty-in-fact toward Plaintiffs.

As a further result of the acts, omissions and occurrences

alleged herein above, Defendant violated, nullified and/or significantly impaired the benefits
provided to Plaintiffs under contractual relationship and thus materially breached its implied
obligation to act in good faith, fairness and honesty-in-fact toward Plaintiffs.
29.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, as alleged herein above,

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5

Plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of lost profits, lost opportunity, and other special and
general damages in an exact amount to be proven at trial in a sum in excess of $10,000.
30.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of the law firm of \Vhite

Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-12l.

COUNT THREE
Rescission
31.

Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 30 above.
32.
of 2000.

Defendant constructed Plaintiffs' dairy facility during the fall of 1999 and winter
As part of Defendant's construction of the dairy facility, it hired subcontractors,

including Standley, to design and install the various operating systems at the dairy.
33.

Substantially all of the manure handling equipment installed at Plaintiffs' dairy by

Defendant was manufactured by Houle.
34.

The design and equipment supplied and installed by Standley and manufactured

by Houle at the direction and request of Defendant was inadequate for the size of Plaintiffs' dairy
and does not function properly.
35.

Plaintiffs are entitled to revoke their acceptance of the insufficient/defective

manure handling equipment provided by Defendant pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2608.
36.

Plaintiffs notified Standley on June 18, 2001, that Plaintiffs were revoking

acceptance of said manure handling equipment, and demanded a return of Plaintiffs' purchase
money pursuant to the Idaho Code § 28-2-608.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6

37.

Defendant has refused to return Plaintiffs' purchase money for the insufficient

and/or defective manure handling equipment.
38.

As a result of the defective and/or insufficient design and installation of

insufficient and/or defective manure handling equipment installed by Standley at the direction
and request of Defendant at the Plaintiffs' dairy, which defective equipment was manufactured
by Houle, and Defendant's refusal to accept Plaintiffs' rescission of said equipment, Plaintiffs
have suffered damages in the amount of the purchase price of the manure handling equipment.
39.

In addition to the damages referenced in the preceding paragraph, Plaintiffs have

also suffered incidental and consequential damages in excess of $35,000 for costs associated
with modifying and renovating the defectivelinsufficient manure handling system in an attempt
to make the same operational.
40.

Plaintiff" have been required to retain the serVIces of the law firm of White

Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121.

COUNT FOUR
Breach of Warranties

41.

Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 40 above.
42.

Plaintiffs requested that Defendant engmeer, design, select equipment for and

construct a dairy facility for a 2000+ head dairy operation.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7

43.

Defendant represented to Plaintiffs that it had the expertise and knowledge to

design and construct such a facility, and represented that it would provide the equipment for the
same.
44.

Plaintiffs relied upon Defendant's expertise, knowledge and expenence

111

designing and constructing the dairy facility.
45.

The design and equipment prepared, constructed and installed by Defendant is

insufficient for managing and disposing of manure from a 2,000 head dairy operation.
46.

Defendant was aware of the intended use and purpose of the dairy facility.

47.

The equipment manufactured by Houle and installed by Standley at the direction

and request of Defendant at the Plaintiffs' dairy does not function or operate as intended and is
not merchantable.
48.

Defendant, having reason to know of the intended purpose of the dairy facility,

and Plaintiffs' reliance on Defendant's skill and judgment to hire a subcontractor who could
select and furnish a suitable system impliedly warranted the system would be fit for the intended
purpose.
49.

Defendant breached the implied warranty of fitness for a paliicular purpose

pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-315.
50.

Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to Idaho

Code § 28-2-314.
51.

Defendant, by representing that it could construct a manure handling system that

would be sufficient to handle manure disposal for a 2,000+ head dairy operation, breached an
express warranty pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-3 13.
52.

As a direct result of Defendant's breach of warranties, Plaintiffs have suffered

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 8

damages, including incidental and consequential damages, in an amount exceeding $150,000 the
exact amount to be proven at trial.
53.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain the serVices of the law firm of White

Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121.

COUNT FIVE
Negligence
54.

Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 53 above.
55.

Defendant owed Plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care in the construction and

maintenance of the dairy facility located at 10394 Melmont Road, Melba, Idaho.
56.

Defendant acted carelessly, recklessly and negligently in failing to construct and

maintain the Plaintiffs' dairy facility in a reasonable manner, resulting in numerous defects in
and around the dairy facility.
57.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent actions, Plaintiffs

have suffered property damage in an amount exceeding $150,000 to be proven with specificity at
trial.
58.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain the serVices of the law firm of White

Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121.

ATTORNEYS FEES
Plaintiffs have been required to retain the law firm of White Peterson, P.A. to prosecute
this action and are entitled to recover attorney fees and costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR lUR Y TRIAL - 9

§§12-120 and 12-121 and any other applicable layv.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs demand a trial composed of no less than twelve (12) persons on all issues so
triable, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b).

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment, Order and Decree of this Court as follows:
l.

For money damages from Defendant that fully and fairly compensate Plaintiffs

for Defendant's breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and negligence in a sum to be determined at trial exceeding $150,000.
2.

For an order allowing Plaintiffs' to rescind acceptance of the manure handling

equipment from Defendant, and damages associated with Defendant's refusal to allow the same,
in an amount to be proven at trial;
3.

For an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and

any other applicable law;
4.

F or such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just.

DA TED this

c-{

1L-day of March, 2005.
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

~

By: --~~~------~~---Kev'
. Dinius, of the Firm
At rneys for Plaintiffs

cm\Z:\Work\D\DeGroot Dairy, LLC\Bcitman Construction 19213.001\Verified CompJaint.doc
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Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
John R. Kormanik
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405
ISB Nos.: 4601,5974,5850
jkf@whitepeterson.com
ked@whifepeterson.com
Jkormanik@whirepetersoncom
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
)

CHARLES DeGROOT, anel DeGROOT
DAlRY, LLC,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

CASE NO. CV05-2277

)
)
)

MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
PENDING ACTIONS

)
)
)

-vs-

BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a
BELTMAN WELDING AND
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington
corporation;
Defendant.

-------------------------------

)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW, Charles Degroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC, the above-named Plaintiffs) by

and through their attorneys of record, the law firm of WHITE PETERSON, P.A., and hereby
MOTION TO CONSOLlDA TE PENDING ACTIONS - 1
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submit their MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS.

This motion is brought

pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), and is supported by the Affidavit of Kevin E.
Dinius submitted concurrently herewith along with the pleadings and record before this Court.
On September 12, 2001, Plaintiffs Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC filed an
action in the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, seeking the Court's determination regarding
claims of breach of contract, recission, breach of warranties, breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against
Defendant STANDLEY TRENCHING, lNC., dlb/a STANDLEY & CO. and claims ofrecission,
breach of warranties and violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against Defendant J.
HOULE & FILS, INC. (Ch('lries DeGroot and DeGroot, LLe v. Standley Trenching, inc., d/b/a

Standley & Co and J Houle & Fils, Inc. Case No. CV-2001-7777) (hereinafter "Standley
action"). In the instant action, Plaintiffs seek the Court's determination regarding claims of
breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, recission, breach of
warranties and negligence against Defendant BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a
BELTMAN WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION. Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC
are parties in intere.st in the claims against the Defendants in the two above referenced actions.
The Standley action involves a commOn question of fact and law pending in the
instant matter before this Court. The instant action relates to Plaintiffs' contract with 13eltman for
the construction of a dairy facility and Defendant Beltman's subcontract with Standley for the
engineering, design and installation of manure handling equipment for Plaintiffs' dairy
constructed in Canyon County, Idaho. The Standley action relates to Standley's engineering,
design and installation of manure handling equipment for Plaintiffs' dairy constructed in Canyon
County, Idaho and Standley'S distributorship of manure handling equipment manufactured by
Defendant J. Houle & Fils, Inc.
MOTION TO CONSOLlDA TE PENDING ACTIONS - 2
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It is in the interest of justice that this Court consolidate the instant action with the
STandley action in order to avoid unnecessary

COSTS,

expense, and delay. Further, the Standley

action arises from the same transaction or occurrence alleged by Plaintiffs in the inst~nt action.
Therefore, consolidation is proper pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).

DATED this

15i--day of March, 2005.
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
By_
.._ _ _ __
K n E. Dinius, of the Firm
torneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the

I~y of March, 2005, a true and

correct copy of the above and foregoing was served upon the following .by:
David 1. Myers

FILICETTl LAW OFFICE, P.A.
5987 W. State S1., Ste. B
Boise, ID 83701

--~

US Mail

___ Overnight Mail
---:,.-_Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 388·0120

><

~ite Peterson

emll:\ WorkIDI!)eGrool Dairy. LL(,\Beltman Construction 192)300 [\Molion to C<)I"'()lidal~.doc
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DAVID 1. MYERS, ISB
28
FILICETTI LAW OFFICE, P.A.
5987 W. State Street, Suite B
Post Office Box 105
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 388-0123
Facsimile: (208) 388-0120
djm@filicettilaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT and DeGROOT
DAIRY, LLC,

Case No. CV05-2277

Plaintiffs,
v.
BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington
corporation,

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
AND DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL

Defendant/Third Party
Plaintiff,
v.
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO., an Idaho corporation,
and 1. HOULE & FILS, INC., a Canadian
corporation,
Third Party Defendants.

Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a BELTMAN
WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION ("Beltman"), by and through its tmdersigned counsel, for
cause of action against the Third Party Defendants, STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC. d/b/a!

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- PAGE I

STANDLEY & CO. ("Standley") and 1. HOULE & FILS, INC. ("Houle"), a Canadian corporation,
complains and alleges as follows:
1.

Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff Beltman has been sued by plaintiffs Charles

DeGroot and DeGroot Dairy, LLC ("DeGroot") for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, rescission, breach of wCLrranties, and negligence - all arising from
subcontract work performed by Standley and equipment manufactured by Houle.
2.

Standley and/or Houle are liable to Beltman for all of the plaintiffs' claims against

Behman.
3.

Standley, under the assumed business name of Standley & Co., offers services and

sells manure handling equipment for dairy operations throughout Idaho, including Canyon County,
Idaho.
4.

Houle is a Canadian corporation, on information and belief, with its principal place

of business in the United States located in Michigan.
5.

Houle manufactures and sells manure handling equipment, which it distributes and

sells throughout the United States, including Idaho.
6.

Standley is a "Seller" within the meaning ofIdaho Commercial Code § 28-2-103.

7.

Houle is a "Seller" within the meaning ofIdaho Commercial Code § 28-2-103.

8.

In about July or August 1999, Behman subcontracted the engineering, design, and

installation of manure handling equipment to Standley for DeGroot's dairy being constructed in
Canyon County, Idaho.
9.

The equipment and products sold by Standley to Beltman are "goods" within the

meaning ofIdaho Commercial Code §§ 28-2-105 and/or 28-2-107.
10.

Beltman is a "Buyer" within the meaning ofIdaho Commercial Code § 28-2-103.
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11.

Beltman collected from DeGroot and in tum paid Standley in excess of $100,000 for

engineering, designing, and installing manure handling equipment (including Houle equipment) at
DeGroot's dairy.
12.

Beltman relied upon Standley'S and Houle's knowledge, representations, expertise,

and experience to design, engineer, and install a properly functioning manure handling system for
DeGroot's Canyon County dairy.
13.

Standley and Houle were aware of the intended purpose of the manure handling

system, including Houle equipment, used on DeGroot's dairy.
14.

Some of the manure handling equipment installed by Standley is manufactured by

15.

The manure handling equipment installed at DeGroot's dairy by Standley IS

Houle.

inadequate, does not function as intended, and is not fit for its intended use.
16.

The manure handling equipment manufactured by Houle and installed at DeGroot's

dairy does not function or work as intended.
COUNT ONE
Breach of Contract
(Standley)

17.

Beltman incorporates and realleges by reference all the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 17 above.
18.

Beltman subcontracted with Standley for the engineering, design, and installation of

manure handling equipment at DeGroot's dairy in Canyon County, Idaho.
19.

Beltman paid Standley in excess of $100,000 for the manure handling equipment

and services of Standley.
20.

Standley failed to provide the equipment and services contracted and as such

materially breached its agreement with Beltman.
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21.

Despite Beltman's and DeGroot's efforts to renovate and repair the system installed

by Standley, the system still does not function properly andlor does not perfonn as contracted.
22.

Beltman has suffered consequential damages as a direct and proximate result of

Standley's breach in an exact amount to be proven at trial.
23.

As a direct result of Standley's breach of contract, Beltman suffered damages in an

amount to be proven at trial, but which amount exceeds $150,000.
24.

Beltman has been required to retain the services of the law finn of Filicetti Law

Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121.

COUNT TWO
Rescission
(Standley & Houle)

25.

Beltman incorporates and realleges by reference all the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 24 above.
26.

Standley designed and selected the materials and equipment for, and installed

manure handling equipment at, DeGroot's Canyon County, Idaho dairy in 1999 and 2000.
27.

Substantially all of the manure handling equipment installed at DeGroot's dairy by

Standley was manufactured by Houle.
28.

The design and equipment supplied and installed by Standley and manufactured by

Houle was inadequate for the size of DeGroot's dairy and does not flllction properly.
29.

Beltman is entitled to revoke its acceptance of the insufficient/defective manure

handling equipment provided by defendants pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-608.
30.

DeGroot notified Standley on June 18,2001 that they were revoking acceptance of

said manure handling equipment, and demanded a return of the purchase money pursuant to Idaho
Code § 28-2-608.
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31.

Standley has refused to return the purchase money for the insufficient/defective

manure handling equipment.
32.

As a result of Standley's design and installation of insufficient/defective manure

handling equipment at DeGroot's dairy, which defective equipment was manufactured by Houle,
and Standley'S refusal to accept the rescission of said equipment, Beltman has suffered damages in
the amolmt of the purchase price of the manure handling equipment.
33.

In addition to the damages referenced in the preceding paragraph, Beltman also has

suffered incidental and consequential damages for costs associated with modifying and renovating
the defectivelinsufficient manure handling equipment in an attempt to make the same operational.
34.

Beltman has been required to retain the services of the law firm of Filicetti Law

Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121.

COUNT THREE
Breach of Warranties
(Standley and Houle)
35.

Beltman incorporates and reallege by reference all the allegations contained m

paragraphs 1 through 34 above.
36.

Beltman, as general contractor, requested that Standley engmeer, design, select

equipment for, and install a manure handling system for a 2000 plus head dairy operation.

37.

Standley represented to Beltman that it had the expertise and knowledge to design,

construct, and install such a system, and represented that it would provide the equipment for the
same.
38.

Houle represented, through the sales of its products, that its manure handling

equipment and goods were sufficient to perform manure disposal functions for dairies of all sizes.

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - PAGE 5
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39.

Beltman relied upon Standley's expertise, knowledge, and experience in designing,

engineering, and installing the manure handling system.
40.

Beltman relied upon Houle's products to be sufficient and capable of performing the

functions for which they are manufactured.
41.

The design and equipment prepared, constructed, and installed by Standley

IS

insufficient for managing and disposing of manure from a 2,000 head dairy operation.
42.

The equipment manufactured and designed by Houle and installed by Standley is

insufficient for managing and disposing of manure from a 2,000 head dairy operation.
43.

Houle and Standley were aware of the intended use and purpose of the manure

handling system and equipment.
44.

The equipment manufactured by Houle and installed by Standley at DeGroot's dairy

does not function or operate as intended and is not merchantable.
45.

Standley, having reason to know of the intended purpose of the manure system and

Beltman's reliance on Standley's skill and judgment to select and furnish a suitable system,
impliedly warranted that the system would be fit for the intended purpose.
46.

Houle, having manufactured and sold manure handling equipment and knowing the

intended use of said equipment, impliedly warranted the equipment would be fit for the intended
purpose.
47.

Standley and Houle breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose

pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-315.
48.

Standley and Houle breached the implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to

Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-314.
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49.

Standley, by representing that its products and services would be sufficient to

handle manure disposal for a 2,000 head dairy operation, breached the warranty of affirmation or
promise pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-313.
50.

Houle, by holding out its products as sufficient to process manure from dairies of all

sizes, breached the warranty of affirmation or promise pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2313.
51.

As a direct result of Standley and Houle's breach of warranties, Beltman has

suffered damages, including incidental and consequential damages, in an amount exceeding
$150,000, with the exact amount to be proven at trial.
52.

Beltman has been required to retain the services of the law firm of Filicetti Law

Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121.

COUNT FOUR
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
(Standley)
53.

Beltman incorporates and realleges by reference all the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 52 above.
54.

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in the contract between

Beltman and Standley.
55.

The covenant requires Standley to act in good faith, with fairness and with honesty-

in-fact toward Beltman. As a further result of the acts, omissions, and occurrences alleged herein
above, Standley violated, nullified, and/or significantly impaired the benefits provided to Beltman
under the contractual relationship and thus materially breached its implied obligation to act in good
faith, fairness, and honesty-in-fact toward Beltman.
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56.

As a direct and proximate result of Standley's conduct, as alleged herein above,

Beltman suffered damages in the form of lost profits, lost opportunity, and other special and general
damages in an exact amount to be proven at trial, in a sum in excess of $1 0,000.
57.

Beltman has been required to retain the services of the law firm of Filicetti Law

Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121.
COUNT FIVE
Violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act
(Standley and Houle)
58.

Beltman incorporates and realleges by reference all the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 57 above.
59.

Standley sold goods and services to Beltman, as the same are defined in the Idaho

Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code §§ 48-602(6) and (7).
60.

Houle is the seller of goods, as defined in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho

Code § 48-602, which goods ultimately were purchased by Beltman.
61.

Standley and Houle's conduct, including without limitation, representations to

Beltman that the goods and services were of a particular quality and standard, constituted unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade and violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act,
Idaho Code §§ 48-601 et seq.
62.

As a direct and proximate result of Standley and Houle's conduct, as alleged

hereinabove, BeItman suffered special and general damages, in a sum in excess of $1 00,000.00, the
exact amount to be proven at trial.
63.

BeItman has been required to retain the services of the law firm of Filicetti Law

Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and 48-608(4).

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - PAGE 8
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ATTORNEY'S FEES
Beltman has been required to retain the law firm of Filicetti Law Office, P.A. to prosecute
this action and is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12120 and 12-121,48-608, and any other applicable law.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Beltman demands a trial composed of no less than twelve (12) persons on all issues so
triable, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b).
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Beltman prays for the following:
1.

An award of damages against Standley for breach of contract in an amOlmt to be
proven at trial, but which amount exceeds $150,000;

2.

An order allowing Beltman to rescind acceptance of the manure handling equipment

from Standley and Houle, and damages associated with Standley and Houle's refusal
to allow the same, in an amount to be proven at trial;
3.

An award of damages against Standley and Houle for breach of the warranty of

fitness for a particular purpose, breach of warranty of merchantability, and breach of
warranty of promise, in an amount to be proven at trial, but which amount exceeds
$150,000;
4.

An award of damages against Standley for breach of the covenant of good faith and

fair dealing in an amount to be proven at trial;
5.

An award of damages against Standley and Houle for violations of the Idaho

Consumer Protection Act, in an amount to be proven at trial;

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - PAGE 9

6.

An award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121,48-601 et

seq., and any other applicable law; and
7.

Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just.

Dated this March 21,2005.
Respectfully submitted,

FILICETTI LAW OFFICE

David 1. Myers
Attorney for Beltman Construction, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this March 21,2005, I caused to be served a true and accurate
copy of THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT by the method indicated below, addressed to the
follo\\ing:

Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
Filicetti Law Office, P.A., P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, ID 83687-7901

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

David 1. Myers
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Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405
ISB Nos.: 4601,5974
Jkf@whitepeterson.com
ked@whitepeterson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
DAIRY, LLC,

Plaintiffs,
-vsBEL TMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a
BEL TMAN WELDING AND
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington
corporation;
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CVOS-2277

STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES
TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING
ACTIONS

)
)

COME NOW Plaintiffs, CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT FARMS, LLC, by and
through their attorneys of record, WHITE PETERSON, P.A., and Defendant BELTMAN
CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION, by and

STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS - 1
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ORIGINAL

through its attorney of record, David 1. Myers, of the law firm FILICETTI LAW OFFICE, and
stipulate, agree and respectfully request the Court to enter its Order Consolidating Pending
Actions.
On September 12, 2001, Plaintiffs Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC filed an
action in the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, seeking the Court's determination regarding
claims of breach of contract, recission, breach of warranties, breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against
Defendant STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a STANDLEY & CO. and claims ofrecission,
breach of warranties and violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against Defendant J.
HOULE & FILS, INC. (Charles DeGroot and DeGroot, LLC v. Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a

Standley & Co. and 1. Houle & Fils, Inc. Case No. CV-2001-7777) (hereinafter "Standley
action"). In the instant action, Plaintiffs seek the Court's determination regarding claims of
breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, recission, breach of
warranties and negligence against Defendant BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a
BELTMAN WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION. Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC
are parties in interest in the claims against the Defendants in the two above referenced actions.
The Standley action involves a common question of fact and law pending in the instant
matter before this Court. The instant action relates to Plaintiffs' contract with Beltman for the
construction of a dairy facility and Defendant Beltman's subcontract with Standley for the
engineering, design and installation of manure handling equipment for Plaintiffs' dairy
constructed in Canyon County, Idaho. The Standley action relates to Standley's engineering,
design and installation of manure handling equipment for Plaintiffs' dairy constructed in Canyon
County, Idaho and Standley's distributorship of manure handling equipment manufactured by
Defendant J. Houle & Fils, Inc.
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS - 2
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h is in the interest of justice that. this Court consolidate tht instant action with the

Standley action in order to avoid unnecessary costs, expense, and delay, Further. the Standley
action arises from the same transaction or occurrence alleged by Plaintiffs in the instant action.
Therefore. consolidation is proper pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Prooedure 42(a).

DATED this

r~-r-day of April. 2005.
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

-----DATED this _ _ day of April. 2005.
FILICETTI LAW OFFICE. F.A.

~---

David J. Myers. of the Firm
Attorney for Defendant
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Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405
ISB Nos.: 4601,5974
j kf@whitepeterson. com
ked@whitepeterson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
DAIRY, LLC,

Plaintiffs,
-vsBELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a
BEL TMAN WELDING AND
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington
corporation;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV05-2277

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE
PENDING ACTIONS

)

)
)

)

Defendant.

)

Pursuant to the Stipulation of the Parties to Consolidate Pending Actions on file herein,
and good cause appearing therefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the instant action shall be
consolidated with the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, matter entitled Charles DeGroot
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS - 1

ORIGINAL

and DeGroot, LLC v. Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. and J Houle & Fils, Inc.
Case No. CV-2001-7777.

. ""-rL----

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this

! S day of April, 2005.
/+~~~------~--r-~~~~~~~
. onorable Juneal C. Kerrick

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the

R

day of April, 2005, a true and

correct copy of the above and foregoing was served upon the following by:
David 1. Myers
FILICETTI LAW OFFICE, P.A.
5987 W. State S1., Ste. B
Boise, ID 83701
Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901

v

US Mail

~
_ _ _Overnight Mail
_ _ _Hand Delivery
- - - Facsimile No. 388-0120

k

US Mail
___ Overnight Mail
___ Hand Delivery
- - - Facsimile No. 466-4405
t

a~~v
for White Peterson
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ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS - 2

William A. McCurdy
~\1cCURDY LAW OFFICES
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: 947-7250
Facsimile: 947-5910
ISB # 1686
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Defendant 1. Houle & Fils, Inc.
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
FARMS,LLC,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

v.
J. HOULE & FILS, INC., a Canadian
corporation,
Defendant.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS
AGAINST THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANT HOULE & FILS, INC.
WITH PREJUDICE

caseNo~~
Case No. ~~ :

CHARLES DEGROOT, and DEGROOT
DAIRY, LLC,
Plaintiffs,

v.
BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington
corporation,
Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff.

v.
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC. d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO., an Idaho
corporation, and J. HOULE & FILS,
INC.
Third Party Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANT HOULE & FILS, INC. WITH PREJUDICE - 1

Third-Party

.L.J'-'L'-'LJlUUJlH

Houle & Fils, Inc. 's ("Houle") Motion for Summary Judgment in

Case No. CV 05-2277 having come before this Court, and the claims alleged against Third-Party
Defendant Houle in the Third-Party Complaint having been withdrawn by Third-Party Plaintiff
Beltman before this Court:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claims against Third-Party Defendant Houle
contained in the Third-Party Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Third-Party Defendant Houle has properly reserved its
right to seek an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in its defense of the Third-Party
Complaint.

I

DATED this ~ day of June, 2007.
'

"

f

!

______________________
Gregory Culet
District Judge

By~

ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANT HOULE & FILS, INC. WITH PREJUDICE - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

th~0

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
day of June, 2007, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Julie Klein Fischer
Kevin E. Dinius
WHITE PETERSON
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200
Nampa, ID 83687

o U.S. Mail

~and-Delivered

o Overnight mail
o Facsimile

Michael E. Kelly ISB # 4351
Peg M. Dougherty I§.W#6043

o U.S. Mail

LOPEZ & ~LNPLLC
1100 Key Fi ncial Center
702 West· aho Street
Post 0 ce Box 856
Bois, Idaho 83701

o Overnight mail

Robert Lewis
Cantrill Skinn Sullivan & King LLP
1423 Tyrel n
P.O. Bo 59
Boise D 83701

/~/

William A. cCurdy
McCURD LA W OFFICES
702 W t Idaho, Ste. 1000
Bois, Idaho 83702

o Hand-Delivered
o Facsimile

o U.S. Mail

~~

\

o U.S. Mail

o Hand-Delivered

o Overnight mail
o Facsimile

ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANT HOULE & FILS, INC. WITH PREJUDICE - 3

~\J

\J

0t\J

o Hand-Delivere&::::J
o Overnight mail J
o Facsimile

AJP
\~

IIV'V

Robert D. Lewis, ISB No. 2713
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 Tyrell Lane
PO Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212
Attorneys for CounterclaimantlRespondent Standley Trenching, Inc.,
d/b/a Standley & Co.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
FARMS, LLC,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/ Appellants,
VS.

Case Nos. CV 01-7777 . /
CV 05-2277
RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY
TRENCHING, INC.'S OBJECTION
AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD

STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE &
FILS, INC., a Canadian corporation,
DefendantslRespondents,
and
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO.
CountercIaimantl
Respondent.
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT

RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAIMA."IT STANDLEY TRENCIllNG, INC.'S
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND
RECORD-l

I.VVI/VV";

DAIRY, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

BELTMA..N CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington
corporation;
DefendantfThird-Party
Plaintiff,
VS.

STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC. d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO., an Idaho corporation,
lL'ld J. HOULE & FILS, INC.
Third~Party

TO:

Defendants.

THE lillOVE-NAMED APELLANTS AND THEIR ATIORNEY OF
RECORD, KEVIN E. D]}'lUS, AND THE REPORTER AND CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the RespondentiCounterclaimant in

the above-entitled proceeding hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 29, I.A.R., the addition
of the following material to the Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record.
additional transcript is to be provided in hard copy:

RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCIDNG, INC.'S
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND
RECORD-2

Any

1.

Reporter's transcript:
The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 2S(a),
LA.R. for the hearing held on June 29,2005

2.

Clerk's Record:
a.

Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis, with exhibits, dated April 18,
2005;

b.

Memorandum of Attorney Fees, dated April 18, 2005;

c.

Motion for Award of Prejudgment Interest, dated April 18,
2005, filed by Counterclaimant;

d.

Order, dated June 6, 2005;

e.

Counterclaimant

Standley

Trenching

Supplemental

Memorandum Supporting Award of Fees, dated July 25,
2005;
f.

Certain portions of the Clerk's Record from the case
Consolidated, DeGroot v. BeItman, Case No. CV-20050002277:
(1)

Civil Complaint, filed March 4, 2005;

(2)

Motion to Consolidate, filed March 18,2005;

(3)

Third-Party Complaint, filed March 22, 2005;

(4)

Stipulation of the Parties to Consolidate Pending

Actions, filed April 19, 2005;

RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND
RECORD-3

(5)

Order to Consolidate Pending Cases, filed April 19,

2005; and
(6)

2.

Dismissal with Prejudice, dated June 20, 2007.

I certift that a copy of this request was served upon the reporter

and clerk of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20.
DATED this

:> (

day of July, 2012.
CANTRILL SKINN'ER SULLIVAN

& KING, LLP

~g~;-

Robert D. Lewis - Of the Firm
Attorneys for RespondentlCounterc1aimant
Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley &
Co.

RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAlMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND
RECORD-4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of July, 2012, I served a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:
Kevin E. Dinius
Michael J. Hailby, II
DINIUS LAW

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile: (208) 475-0101
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile: (208) 947-5910
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile: (208) 344-8479
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile: (208) 454-7442
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile:
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

5680 E. Fran..1din Rd. - Suite 130
Nampa, ID 83687
Attorneys for Plaintiffs DeGroot &
DeGroot Farms, LLC
William A. McCurdy
MCCURDY LAW OFFICES

702 West Idaho Street - Suite 11 00
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Defendant J Houle & Fils,
Inc.
M. Michael Sasser
SASSER & INGLIS

1902 W. Judith La.."1e - Suite 100
PO Box 5880
Boise, ID 83705
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant
Standley
Laura Whiting
Court Reporter for the
Honorable Gregory M. Culet
CANYON COUNTY COURTHOUSE

1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
Judge's Copy to Chambers:
Honorable Molly Huskey
CANYON COUNTY COURTHOUSE

1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

Robert D. Lewis

RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAlMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND
RECORD-5

Robert D. Lewis, ISB No. 2713
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN &
1423 Tyrell Lane
PO Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212

KING

F~.~.k_fo ~ f3.M.

LLP
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T,CRAWFORD,OEPUTY

Attorneys for CounterclaimantiRespondent Standley Trenching, Inc.,
d/b/a Standley & Co.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
FARMS,LLC,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Appellants,

Case Nos.

CV 01-7777
CV 05-2277

ORDER TO AUGMENT THE
RECORD ON APPEAL

vs.
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE &
FILS, INC., a Canadian corporation,
Defendants/Respondents,
and
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO.
Counterclaimant/
Res ondent.

ORDER TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 1

L

CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT
DAIRY, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington
corporation;
Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC. d/b/a
STANDLEY & CO., an Idaho corporation,
and J. HOULE & FILS, INC.
Third-Party Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 29, LA.R, that the record on
appeal be augmented by addition to the Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record. The
additional transcript is to be provided in hard copy and is described in 1. below. The additional
Clerk's Record is described in 2. below.
1.

Reporter's transcript:
The entire reporter's transcript as defined in Rule 25(a),
I.A.R. for the hearing held on June 29, 2005, on Motion
for Fees and Costs and for Reconsideration. Sue Wo1f as
Court Reporter.

ORDER TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 2

2.

Clerk's Record:
a.

Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis, with exhibits, dated April 18, 2005;

b.

Memorandum of Attorney Fees, dated April 18, 2005;

c.

Motion for Award of Prejudgment Interest, dated April 18, 2005,
filed by Counterclaimant;

d.

Order, dated June 6, 2005;

e.

Counterclaimant Standley Trenching Supplemental Memorandum
Supporting Award of Fees, dated July 25,2005;

f.

Certain portions of the Clerk's Record from the case Consolidated,
DeGroot v. Beltman, Case No. CV-2005-0002277:
(1)

Civil Complaint, filed March 4,2005;

(2)

Motion to Consolidate, filed March 18,2005;

(3)

Third-Party Complaint, filed March 22, 2005;

(4)

Stipulation of the Parties to Consolidate Pending Actions,

filed April 19,2005;
(5)

Order to Consolidate Pending Cases, filed April 19,2005;

and
(6)

Dismissal with Prejudice, dated June 20, 2007.

ORDER TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 3

DATED this

~day of ~

,2012.

ORDER TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on the ' \ day of ~
,2012, I served a true and
correct copy ofthe above and foregoing instrument, by inethod indicated below, upon:
Kevin E. Dinius
Michael J. Hanby, II

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile: (208) 475-0101
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile: (208) 947-5910
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile: (208) 344-8479
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

Sue Wolf
Court Reporter for the
Honorable Thomas F. Neville
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile:
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

Robert D. Lewis
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys for Standley Trenching, Inc.,
d/b/a Standley & Co

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile: (208) 345-7212
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

DfNIUsLAW

5680 E. Franklin Rd. - Suite 130
Nampa, ID 83687
Attorneys for Plaintifft DeGroot &
DeGroot Farms, LLC
William A. McCurdy
McCURDY LA W OFFICES

702 West Idaho Street - Suite 1100
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Defendant J Houle & Fils,
Inc.
M. Michael Sasser
SASSER & INGLIS

1902 W. Judith Lane - Suite 100
PO Box 5880
Boise, ID 83705
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant
Standley

Clerk

ORDER TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES JAY DE GROOT, etal.,
Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsAppellant,
-vsSTANDLEY TRENCHING, INC, etal.,
Defendant-CounterclaimantRespondent,

And
J. HOULE & FILS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-01-07777*C
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
is being sent as an exhibit:

NONE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _ + - _ day of December, 2012.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
III
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CHARLES JAY DE GROOT, etal.,
Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsAppellant,
-vsSTANDLEY TRENCHING, INC, etal.,
Defendant-CounterclaimantRespondent,

And
J. HOULE & FILS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-01-07777*C
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Supplemental Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound
under my direction as, and is a true, full correct Supplemental Record of the pleadings
and documents as requested and ordered.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _-'--_ day of December, 2012.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
uUU~VJ. the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CHARLES JAY DE GROOT, etal.,
Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsAppellant,
-vsSTANDLEY TRENCHING, INC, etal.,
Defendant-CounterclaimantRespondent,

And
J. HOULE & FILS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court No.

39406-2011

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Supplemental Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of
record to each party as follows:
Kevin E. Dinius and Michael J. Hanby II, DINUS LAW
M. Michael Sasser, SASSER & INGLIS P.C.
Robert D. Lewis, CANTRILL SKINNER SULLIVAN & KING, LLP
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this

_J--_

day of December,

2012.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
III
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

